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The research effort represented by tus report . was funded
under ONR grant No. N000 1 483W R30 236, dated 28 December 1982.
The Statement cf Work, which specified the task to be accom-
Dlished read as follows:
Market environments relevant to the oDle source versus l
dual source decision for the procurement of major
weapon systems will be identified. The pricing behav-
ior of contractors operating in :hese environments
will be analyzed, and its potential impact on program
cost will be studied. Suitable dita from NAVAIR's
contract file will be used, if appropriate, for empir-
ical verification. The objective is to derive an op-
timal acguisition strategy for the virious market en-
vironments.
Hopefully, the reader will judge the S04 to have been satis-
fied. In cur own opinion it has been exceeded, due largely
to the diligent assistance and efforts of an assemblage of
knowledgeable and interested people. No study of this mag-
nitude is undertaken without help, but the quality of the
cooperation we received was exceptional. Among those making
special contributions were Dan Nussbaum and Wayne Wesson, of
the Naval Air Systems Command. Mike Beltramc and Dave Jor-
dan, of SAI, also served their advisory roles above and be-
yond the call of duty. We are particularly indebted to LT
David Britt, NFS graduate, who spent countless hours gather-
ing and analysing lata. Finally, James Smith, Director cf
the Navy Accounting and Finance Center's Planning Division,
deserves special recognition for "bringing it all together"
and "making it happen." The authors alone, of course, ac-
cept full responsibility for whatever shortcomings and er-
rors the wcrk may contain.
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EXECUTIYE SOHHABY
With growing austerity pressures from tha Administration,
Congress, and tha genaral public, DoO decision makers are
under a mandate to usa scarce resources wisely. It is a
widely held belief that competition can produce great sav-
ings in acquisition costs. However, much careful analysis
of the financial implications of competition shows that sav-
ings cannot be expected from every competitive procurement.
Regardless of whethar a procurement is for a spare part,
clothes, electronic components, or an idvanced major weapon
system, it is generally true that if taa following two con-
ditions are met, price competition is a possibility:
1. Adequate product description-- Tha product is
describable in a rigorous but not overly re-
strictive manner so potential suppliers can un-
derstand and comply with the Government's re-
quirements.
2. Availability of suppl iers--Tha Government has
access to at least two independent suppliers
with the technical competence, requisite facil-
ities and willingness to satisfy the require-
ments.
The reprocurement of major weapon systems, however, may or
may not be a good setting in which to implement competition.
The decision requires in-depth analysis on an individual
case basis. Unfortunately, DoD has no exact method for de-
ciding when to introduce competition, or even whether compe-
tition should be introduced.
The most viable solution is to identify the major price
determinants that would capture the assense of pricing beha-
voir for a group of major weapon system suppliers. The ob-
jectives of this study are therefore:
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1. Tc identify the significant variable (s) that




2. To estimate a reasonable range Df values for




mation by practicing analysts.
In this study we have found that the most significant
question to ask is,
How do conditions of industry capacity utilization
affect the competitive environMn* In *n'~¥arT = T7
which itself is an essential element in sole-
source versus dual-source decision?
SiHdj A2£5I^ch and Organization
The study approach used in this project is mirrored in its
organization. We begin with a thorough saarch of the rele-
vant literature. Empirical works investigating potential
savings from introducing competition as well as theoretical
literature dealing with price competition are reviewed.
DcD contractor profitability is very much a related is-
sue. Some feel defense business profits are too low. Oth-
ers allege defense contractors aarn "excessive" profits. We
address the contradiction between these viewpoints.
Next we turn to the heart of the guestion--the dual
sourcing of a selected grcup of major weapon systems. We
combine the results with contractor and industry data which
were extracted both from prior studies and from various oth-
er sources for analysis. Based on this analysis, many of
the important variants of the sole source versus dual source
question are addressed.
Finally, under the premise that actual payoff to the Gov-
ernment is available only through application, we explore
the financial consequences of making the dual sourcing deci-
sion with the method we develop.
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Li terature R ev iew
In Chapter 2 we review the findings ji tha important past
studies of the effects of competition on OoD acquisitions.
Past empirical works on the costs and benefits of introduc-
ing competition may be grouped broadly into two categories:
those examining the effects of competition on a SHficific
program, and those examining a selsctei sam£le of programs.
Findings frcm both groups have shown both positive and neg-
ative results wh-^n weapon systems which wen previously pro-
cured on a sole-source basis are dual sourcsd.
Empirical studies in recent years have documented cases
where increases in production rate have been associated with
increases, decreases, and no change in the unit production
cost of weapon systems. The theoretical foundation of a
production rate impact on cost is closely related to the
theory of economies of scale. However, to address the issu?
of the impact of production rata on program cost, one must
make a subtl? distinction between the extent to which a firm
is utilizing its overall production capacity and the rate at
which the units procured under a particular program are be-
ing produced.
To introduce a second source for a aajor weapon system,
additional investment over and above what would be necessary
for a sole-source award is required. Thase include the cost
of transferring a complex production technology, and of the
additional costs which must be incurred to set up and manage
a competitive production environment. It is difficult and
expensive to get a good technical data package (TDP) for the
second contractor, and even more difficult to persuade the
first producer to pass alcng to a competitor the benefits of
his manufacturing experience.
When a second source is to be introduce! during th= pro-
duction phase, another important question ie ; "What will the
first unit price be for the second source?" It is common
for the second scurce to have a lower first unit price than
the initial source did. Although ths impact of the many
relevant factors on the second source's first unit price
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cannot be measured directly, surroqata measures hav2 bean
attempted by several analysts.
The ability to estimate the the affects of competition en
price reduction rates is essential in determining the amount
of potential savings in recurring unit cost. It is general-
ly expected that the unit price of products will drop under
competitive pressure. The size of the expected savings may
be a function cf three factors:
r
1. a one-time, probably immediate, reduction in
unit price when competition beqins--the so-
called "shift,"
2. a continuous, or sustained reduction in price
because of a steeper price-reduction curve
("rotation"), and
3. a change in unit production costs because of
the reduced production rate.
i
There are many studies that have addressed the issues of es-
timating the shift and rotation of price-reduction curves
when competition is introduced, but the results have be=n
far from conclusive. Attempts to identify explanatory fac-
tors have generally failed.
The decision to introduce a second source for a major
weapon system requires a prospective evaluation of the fi-
nancial conseguences , but it also requires evaluation of a
wide variety cf other factors which, by nature, do not easi-
ly lend themselves to quantified analysis. The rich litera-
ture on competition covers a spectrum of factors and vari-
ables to be considered by the decision maker.
Contractor Profitability
Clearly, the price the Government must pay to acquire goods
from a contractor serves two functions. One cf these is to
reimburse the contractor fcr the costs it must incur to sup-
ply the goods. The other is the generation of profit. Most
past studies have failed to make this distinction, and have
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therefore failed to capture the volatility of the prici the
Government must pay under different market sonditions.
In Chapter 3 we examine data covering 20 years, and study
hew the profitability of DoD contracts has been influenced.
We ask hew profitable contractors are in their DoD versus
commercial business segments, and whether the risk levels
faced are equivalent.
Our conclusion is that Program Managers (PM's) have been
able to take advantage of the bargaining power they hold to
buy goods at substantially lower profit margins when capaci-
ty utilization is low. The returns earned by contractors on
DoD business are measurably lower than the returns on com-
mercial business during periods of low capacity utilization.
Also, the volatility of returns is higher for DoD busi-
ness which means the risks are viewed by management as being
somewhat higher. In short, there appears to be reason fcr
concern, given management's outlook on the risk/return rela-
tionship for DoD business.
Dete r gi nan t s ci Price
"Rule of thumb" quantifications of the savings resulting
from competition have been disappointingly unreliable. The
research which has been dene on the known histories suggests
that dual sourcing of major weapon systems has resulted in
added life cycle costs as often as it has produced savings
Most recent attempts to sharpen our cost estimation abil-
ities have focused on adding a production rate term to the
conventional learning curve modal. However, the magnitude
(and even the direction) of the effect on total program cost
of altering production rates is not always f oreseeabl e--par-
ticularly under dual sourcing. So its inclusion in the mod-
el, while often helpful, sometimes leads the analyst astray.
In Chapter 4 we learn that the effeot of competition on
the cost of acquiring major weapon systems under dual sourc-
ing can more reliably be estimated by substituting an indus-
try capacity utilization concept for the production rate
concept. Simply said, competition produces greater savings
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when firms are "hungry;" when the industry is very active-,
dual scurcir.g is of little benefit as a oost reducer.
As a demonstration, consider Table 0.1. The program sav-
ings (loss) data were taken from SAI's report [Beitramo and
Jordan, 1982]. The capacity utilizations were averages of
the a nn ual figures for the aerospace industry for the years
during which dual-source procurement was in effect for each
program.
TABLE .1































By examining Table 0.1, the reader can confirm that SAI
determined that only three of the seven programs generated
sufficient savings from competition to more than offset the
investments reguired to obtain them. (In calculating these
savings, Beitramo and Jordan followed tha recommended proce-
dure cf applying a 10% discount rate to the estimated cost
savings, and deducting the cost to the buyer of establishing
competition.) In each of the three "savings" cases, indus-
try capacity utilization averaged less than 80% during the
dual source phase of the procurement. Each time a loss re-
sulted from- competition, capacity utilization was running
above 30%,
Our interpretation is that greater savings do appear to
have resulted from competition when- capacity utilization was
relatively low. Indeed, implementation of dual sourcing
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when capacity utilization was higher thin aoout 30 % s = ems to
have been, in retrospect, unwise.
Implementation
Based on the analysis contained in Chapter 4, w- conclude
that knowledge of the state of capacity utilization in the
aerospace industry is an important component of the correct
management of acguisition programs whan competition is in
effect. However, we find that more research is naaded to
enable us confidently to implement such concepts.
In this final chapter we discuss tha possibility of im-
plementation. Of specific interest will be our ability to
make ex ante use of the "80% rule" as a practical, money-
saving procurement tool. We feel it would be necessary to
make improvements in our ability to forecast aerospace ca-
pacity utilization before it could actually be used as a de-
cision variable.
Some with whom we have discussed th = results of our work
have pointed out that the model could be improved by using
the capacity utilization measures for particualr firms rath-
er than for the industry. He totally agree, and would like
to explore this improvement. Our modal, however, may be
viewed and used as a "scoping" device to examine the most
likely outcome under given market conditions. This impor-
tant consideration has to date been ignored.
The results of the study point the way for development
and implementation of superior acquisition strategies. The
strategies which should fellow will be applicable to various
market environments.
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There are two reasons why the cost sstiaating methods used
in defense acquisition are appropriate subjects for an in-
depth, financial management improvement analysis. First,
although the total proportion of the defense budget which
goes for major weapon systems acquisition is smaller than
the part devoted to personnel and other operating expendi-
tures, the funding for the latter is somewhat automatic
while the funding for the former must underjo closer scruti-
ny by both DoD and Congress during the annual budgeting pro-
cess. In the early stages of the development of a new sys-
tem, the cost depends on so many variables that the
estimating process necessarily requires assumptions about
future governmental decisions as well as on the market envi-
ronment in which the procurements will take place. Substan-
tiating the budget request requires "what if" drills to gen-
erate reliable ccst figures.
Second, with growing austerity pressures from the Admin-
istration, Congress, and the general public, DoD decision
makers are under a mandate to use scarce resources wisely.
It is a widely-held belief that competition can produce
great savings in acquisition costs. However, savings cannot
be expected from every competitive procurement. A careful
analysis of the financial implications of competition under-
different market environments is therefore essential to the
efficient and effective utilization of public resources.
1.1 NEED FOR COMPETITION
There is a deep-seated and historic belief that the best
model for Government procurement is solicitation of price
offers from a maximum number of qualified sources. Indeed,
there are many advantages to the Government of competition
if it is applied properly. Various imperatives for competi-
tion in defense procurements will be discussed below.
October 27, 1983 Chapter 1
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1. 1. 1 Co age tit ion Imperatives
Since 1809, statutes, regulations and rxacu-.ive orders have
consistently affiraed the position th.it government procure-
ment must ba made on a competitive basis to the greatest
possible extent. In 1969, the Subcommittee on Priorities
and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee
called for vastly expanded use of competition for procuring
all Defense Department material. This position was reaf-
firmed by the current Administration in the Carlucci Initia-
tives [ 1981].
We are convinced that we have now a historic and
>rove the
ir coop-
ying out these deci-
sions.
1.1.1.1 Financial Benefits
In 1965, Secretary of Defense B. S. McNamara reported to the
Joint Economic Committee that the General Accounting Office
had evidence of dollar savings on the order of 25^ or more
when competition was introduced for reprocuremant of an item
which had a scle-source produce ment history. Since then,
this 25X saving figure has been quoted repeatedly. While
there are questions about the ge neralizability of the state-
ment, the fact remains that, in a competitive market envi-
ronment, the price paid by the buyer tends to move in the
direction of the minimum costs of production.
1. 1. 1.2 flobilization Base
In the interest of industrial mobilization, the DoD may in-
troduce cos-petition to strengthen the defense industrial
base. The Defense Acquisition Regulations provide general
authority to develop and implement plans and programs to
provide an industrial mobilization base which can meet pro-
duction requirements for essential military supplies and
services, and specifically accommodate the division of pro-
duction requirements between two or more contractors to pro-
vide for such a base.
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1. 1. 1.3 Improved Technical Performance
Improved equipment performance frequently results from com-
petition. A fresh look at the hardware by competent engi-
neers of the competing firms often results in technical im-
provements and better problem solving techniques.
1. 1. 1.4 Social and Political Considerations
Although cost reduction, mobilization base and improved per-
formance are important reasons for introducing competition,
it may also be desirable for a wide variety of other purpos-
es. At the legislative level, competing suppliers have been
awarded contracts for the sake of fairness, evenhandedness,
employment, or other political and social considerations.
1.2 RE^OIREHEHTS POR COMPETITION
In spite of th<= overwhelming opinion favoring price competi-
tion, and formal commitment to its use, the DoD nas histor-
ically employed this method for only about a third of its
total procurement dollars. This is because the defense mar-
ket is different from a traditional competitive market.
Competition in traditional markets arises when buyers and
sellers are numerous and individually so unimportant in the
market that their separate actions have no meaningful impact
on market price. While some items in fact are procured by
DoD in such a market, many important aspects of the DoD mar-
ket for other iteas are different. DoD is often the only
buyer, and consequently exerts complete control over market
size, the timing of demand and, indeed, whether there will
be a market. Products usually do not already exist but, in-
stead, are created at the behest of DoD.
Regardless of whether the procurement is for a spare
part, clothes, electronic components, or an advanced major
weapon system, it is generally true that if the following
two conditions are met, price competition in the DoD market
is financially desirable:
October 27, 1983 Chapter 1
PAGE 1.4
Using these two requirements to evaluate the potential for
competition, cne can easily conclude, as confirmed by recent
studies, that small value items with large quantity require-
ments, and products that are identical to or close deriva-
tives of commercial products, are the best candidates for
price competition- -and that major weapon systems R&D and
initial production may not be good candidates.
It may or may not be prudent to rsprocare major weapon
systems through competition. The decision requires in-depth
analysis on an individual case basis due to the uniqueness
of each system.
1.3 COMPETITION IN PHOCDBEHENT OF MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS
Procurement of major weapon systems poses a unique problem.
Since the Government is the only buyer, it dictates the size
of the market and the timing of demand. Compounding these
uncertainties to the supplier is the heavy investment needed
to become a supplier. In this kind of environment, the
availability of suppliers may be linked to the willingness
of the Government to absorb at least part of the risk, which
could mean that the government must incur investment costs
to develop a supplier or tc introduce a competitor.
DoD has no explicit basis for deciding when to introduce
competition, or even whether competition should be intro-
duced. In fact, an assessment by Archibald, et al. of the
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current state of the art seems to be regrettably true [ 1981:
p. 52]:
Current. understanding of the competitive :?d:o-
curement process is meager. it would, for exam-
ple, be an understatement to say that the determi-
nants of post-competition price differences have
not yet been identified. We are unable to discov-
er a relatively complete list of even the poten-
tial determinants.
Compounding the issue is the need to increase the indus-
trial mobilization base fcr advanced lajor weapon systems.
The need for a mobilization base often calls for a dual
sourcing strategy in which the government procures the need-
ed guantity frcm both sources. However, no one had speci-
fied how much additional cost is justified in order to
achieve this objective.
1. 3. 1 Econoiic Liaits
Although dual sourcing does generate competitive pressures
among firms, it does not confer the full benefits of pure
price competition because of the division of the procurement
guantity among a small number (as a practical matter, two)
of suppliers, and the lack of competition at the "guaranteed
buy" level. Coupled with the fact that a substantial amount
of initial investment by bcth the government and the second
source is often needed to establish dual source competition,
the net financial advantage of dual sourcing is limited, and
far from precisely predictable.
A multitude of relatively recent studiss undertaken to
guantify the extent of savings from dual sourcing have un-
fortunately produced inconclusive results. A large number
of variables, including the Government's own policy deci-
sions, may contribute to the difference in the price to be
paid for the product.
1.3-2 Research Li»its
A mathematical reguirement for any attempt to develop a
forecasting model is to have a large number of observations
so that a trend can be detected. For all practical purpos-
es, this fact poses a genuine limit to the potential for
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drawing useful conclusions from major weapon systems re-
search, as several recent studies have found.
If the value of dual-sourcs competition cannot be meas-
ured with a reasonable degree of confidence, then defense of
budgetary estimates and development of a financially sound
acquisition stretegy is exceedingly difficult. Given th<3
small available data base, the most viable solution is to
identify the major price determinants that would capture the
essence of pricing behavoir for a group of major weapon sys-
tem suppliers. The relevant forces should be identifiable
—
-and the basic methodology and procedures can be standard-
ized.
1.* A NEED FOR "»HAT IP" DRILLS
If the development of an exact forecasting formula is not
feasible, the determination of the net financial advantage
or disadvantage of dual sourcing depends on specific assump-
tions about the market environment, the contractor's busi-
ness strategy and pricing behavior, the Government's poli-
cies and decisions, and a host of other factors. In this
case, the credibility of the projected financial data hinges
on the reasonableness of the assumptions made. Therefore,
the "what if" drill can be a valuable tool in estimating the
financial effects of dual sourcing. Consider three advan-
tages.
First, decision makers are reminded of the contingent na-
ture of the numbers. Discrepencies between the estimates
and actual numbers would be easier to reconcile if the orig-
inal assumptions were examined. The need for such an exer-
cise is hinted at by ADM Seymour in his commentary on the
need to improve costing credibility on Capitol Hill [1982:
28, 3 2].
We always budget something less. And I'm not sure
that message always sticks when we talcs it to Con-
gress.
Second, as discussed earlier, dual source competition may
be introduced for a wide variety of reasons other than fi-
nancial. At the legislative level, competing suppliers have
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been awarded contracts on grounds of fairness, ev -r.-hind?!-
ness, employment, and so on. At tha military department
level, mobilization base and improvement in technical per-
formance are often cited as major reasons for dual sourcing.
In our view, policy issues such as fairness, employment and
mobilization base do not easily render themselves to quanti-
fied analysis. However, a financial cast-benefit analysis
of the dual sourcing decision, based on a known s|t of poli-
cy, assumpt io ns can be a valuable tool. If the result shows
dual sourcing is uneconomical, the magnitude of the disecon-
omy can still serve as a useful input in setting Policy.
Third, conveying the assumptions made by the Government
to the suppliers could minimize much of the guesswork and
uncertainties faced by both parties. Such an exercise
should enhance, rather than detract from, the reliability of
the cost estimates.
1.5 STODY OBJECTIVES
As discussed earlier, there are literally hundreds of fac-
tors that may influence the price paid for goods und^r dual
sourcing. Our objectives must therefore be limited.
The objectives of this study are:
1. To develop a standardized methodology to esti- I
mate the financial consequences of dual source
competition.
2. To identify significant variables that must be
considered in evaluating dual-sourcing strat-
egy.
3. To estimate a reasonable range of values for
major relevant variables to facilitate estima-
I
tion by practicing analysts.
L
In order to accomplish the objectives listed above, we will
focus on the major questions facing ths analyst when the
second sourcing decision is contemplated.
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1.5.1 Specific Research Questions
The following questions will serve as a touchstone in the
selection of important variables to be considered in oar
analysis.
1. How do conditions of industry capacity utiliza-
tion affect the competitive anvironmant in the
market, which itself is an essential element in
sole-source versus dual-source decision?
2. To what extent does "gaming" activity erode the
potential benefits of dual sourcing?
3. How effective is the audit and renegotiation
process in stimulating the accnomic advantage
of competition?
4. Could DoD's efforts to raduca product acqusi-
tion costs be so effective as to make the DoD
market so unattractive as to affectively elimi-
nate potential suppliers?
5. Would a reduction in the prices sevarly weaken
the financial strangth of potential suppliers?
6. Might (4> and (5) lead to higher costs in the
event of a surge in requiremants due to a pro-
longed emergency?
7. Is the additional administrative cost of dual
sourcing large enough to reguire quantification
and inclusion in the analysis?
8. Are the nonrecurring investment costs required
to introduce a second sourca so significant as
to offset potential savings from price reduc-
tions?
1.5.2 Assumptions
In this study, we will assume that dual sourcing is contem-
plated when the specifications have been developed and a
sole-source supplier is in or will soon begin the production
phase. This would exclude acquisition actions involving:





1. Parallel developments under research and devel-
opment programs wher = two contractors are usu-
ally concurrently funded for proptotype hard-
ware development leading to a "fly-off".
2. Obtaining an item from a new source subsequent
to a default termination.
3. Component breakout, involving the decision as
to whethar components should be purchased by
the Government directly and furnished to an end
itam contractor as Government Furnished Materi-
al (GFE) or purchased by the :oni:ac:or (CFE) .
4. The splitting of an award under invitation for
bids procedures resulting from special social
considerations such as Small Business or Labor
i —
Surplus Area set-asides.
1.6 STUDY APPOBACH AMD OBGANIZ ATIOH
The study approach used in this project is mirrored in the
organization of the handbook. There are four remaining
chapters. A brief description of each follows.
1.6.1 Literature Review
This study began with a thorough search of tha relevant lit-
erature. Empirical works investigating potential savings
from introducing competition as well as theoretical litera-
ture dealing with price competition wara reviewed. This
phase was essential to the identification of guesticns and
the major variables the decision maker must consider. Many
of the major variables considered in this study ware previ-
ously identified in the empirical works reviewed hare. How-
ever, a review of the literature in cost accounting and eco-
nomics helped to identify several factors which had not bean
addressed in prior studies.
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1.6.2 Profitability
DoD contractor profitability is very nuch a related issue.
Some feel defense business profits are too low. So low, in
fact, as tc run a risk that the defense business niay be con-
verted into a "market of last resort." Others allege de-
fense contractors earn "excessive" profits. The contra-
diction between these viewpoints is addressed in this
section, where we study factors that influence the profit-
ability of DoD contractors. This analysis leads to ques-
tions which were not addressed in prior studies.
1.6.3 Deter ain ants of Price
Several recent studies have examined the costs or benefits
of dual sourcing a selected group of major weapon systems.
We combined these results with contractor and industry data,
which were extracted from prior studies and from various
other sources, for further analysis. Based on this analy-
sis, many of the important variants of the sole source ver-
sus dual source question were addressed. The methodology
needed to evaluate the financial consequence of dual sourc-
ing is developed.
1.6.4 I JSBlggfStation and Conclusions
Under the premise that any actual payoff to the Government
of new knowledge is available only through its use, we ex-
plore the financial consequences of making the dual sourcing
decision using a method that incorporates the major vari-
ables identified in Chapter 4. The method permits changes
in parameter values to allow the decision maker the flexi-
bility of evaluating financial consequences under different
sets of assumptions, or the so-called "what if" drill.




In this chapter we review the findings of the important past
studies of the affects of competition on DoD acquisitions.
Both empirical works investigating potential savings from
introducing competition as well as theoretical literature
dealing with frice competition are reviewed.
Past empirical works on the costs and benefits of intro-
ducing competition may be grouped broaily into two catego-
ries: those examining the effects of competition on a spe-
cific program, and those examining a 33lected sample of
programs. Findings from both groups have been far from con-
clusive. Even after adjusting for differences in measure-
ment methods, both positive and negative savings have been
found for competitively procured weapon systems which were
previously procured on a sole-source basis. what can be es-
tablished from these empirical works is that savings are
possible frcm introducing competition, but losses are possi-
ble too. Unfortunately, the outcome does not appear always
to be predictable. Exactly what conditions lead to savings
versus losses is not known.
To resolve this uncertainty has been the major objective
of no less than fiv e comprehensive studies conducted by the
Army and the Institute for Defense Analysis [U.S. Army,
1972; Zusman, et al. , 1974; Lovett and Norton, 1978; Bran-
non, et al. r 1979; Daly, et al. , 1979]. These have all been
attempts to identify a relationship between the expected
savings frcm competition and potential explanatory vari-
ables. However, the results frcm thsse studies show that
the magnitude and direction of the expected savings has been
so variable that no simple representation of the effects of
introducing competition is likely to help reduce the uncer-
tainty faced by a decision maker.
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While the total number of programs examined in the five
above-mentioned studies exceeds forty, it should be pointed
out that most of the data selected wars not of particular
value in predicting the expected savings from second sourc-
ing major weapon systems. One reason is that most of the
competitions were in the form of winner-t alee-all, or buy-
outs. Very few cases cf split-buy competition were ob-
served. Another is that the investment cost fcr introducing
competition was often assumed to be relatively insignifi-
cant, if not negligible, since most observed cases were
mass-produced, low unit-value items. For major weapon sys-
tems, the gross savings from introducing competition must be
sufficient to justify the signif icant costs and risks asso-
ciated with competitive procurement.
Due to the constraint cf a limited data base and the com-
plexity of the issue, attempts to construct a simple, deter-
ministic guantitative node! for evaluation of the second-
sourcing issue have to date been fruitless. Moreover, past
studies have tended to rely upon strictly empirical method-
ology. That is, each analysis ignore! factors such as the
suppliers' different pricing stretegies under different mar-
ket conditions, and placed complete reliance on empirically-
based constructs (such as learning curves) is the conceptual
foundation for analyzing the decision.
Our approach to the issue will be to begin with the eco-
nomic theory cf the firm in mind. This conceptual founda-
tion will enable us to identify the major questions and
variables to be considered by a decision maker.
However, a review of the existing work will enable us to
translate the theoretical questions and variables into oper-
ational terms, and to identify what has lad has not been ad-
dressed. With this "decomposition" approach, we can evalu-
ate prior works to see whether any light has been shed on
the variables to be considered. The overriding concern is
to seek any information that would reduce the uncertainty
surronding the influence of each variable.
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Our discussion of the state-of-the-art will b^ organized
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2. 1 PROD OCT ION RATES
Aoguisition experience in the DoD has shown -.hat production
rates for new military weapon systems are subject to fre-
quent adjustment. Congressional pressure or world crisis,
among many other factors, may be sufficient ~o alter previ-
ously planned production rates. Yet the impact on procure-
ment costs of these rate changes is not generally under-
stood. Empirical studies in recent years have documented
cases where increases in production rate nave been associat-
ed with increases, decreases, and no change in the unit pro-
duction cost of weapon systems [Smith, 1976].
2. 1. 1 Production Rate and Cost
The theoretical foundation of a production rate impact or.
cost is closely related to the theory of economies of scale.
However, to address the issue of the impact of production
rats en program cost, one must make a subtle distinction be-
tw een.
1. the extent to which a firm is utilizing its
overall production capacity, and
2. the ra~e at which the units procured under a
particular program are being produced.
I
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The former relates, at least in thaory, to production fac-
tors which serve the firm's total output and may, in aggre-
gata, be fixed. The latter depends on the supply of on? or
more production factors that relate to the specific pro-
gram—and are usuaLly variable. These two phenomena ir* re-
lated in that they often act in concert.
To illustrate the effects of production rate on produc-
tion cost, let us assume that there are three plants capable
of producing the same item, say a missile. Further assume
each plant wculd produce nothing but this particular mis-
sile. In Figure 2.1, a cost curve is shown for each plant
as AUC1 (Average Unit Cost 1) , AUC2, and AU33 respectively.
The lowest-cost production rates for the individual plants
are assumed to be 50, 100, and 150 per period respectively.
Plant 2 is the most efficient plant if output quantity is
not a major decision factor, because it shows the lowest
possible average unit cost. But if only 43 units are to be
produced Plant 1 is more efficient. At 150 units Plant 3 is
the more efficient. It should also ba noted that 40 mis-
siles is not the most efficient rate of output for Plant 1.
It could produce at a 50-missile rate at a lower average to-
tal cost per unit than it could at 40 units.
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A question which may be facing tha acquisition manager
is, "At what production level should tha contractor's plant
ba f acilit izad?" If Plant 2 is selected as a sola source
contractor, it should be faciliti-zed to produce 100 missiles
par period (at tha most efficient level). Any annual buy
quantity greater or smaller than 100 missiles will drive up
tha average unit cost, other things being equal.
New assume that the scle source contractor was facili-
tized to produce 100 missiles per year, but that the annual
buy turned out to be smaller than expected, say 80 missiles.
If a second source is introduced, for whatever reason, and
facilitized at, say 50 missiles par ysar, then the second
source has a built-in advantage over tha original source in
a split-buy competition due to the impact of production rate
on prcducticn cost.
2.1.2 Production Hate Factor in Prior Studies
Those who have addressed the impact of production rates on
program cost generally agree that the production rate is a
significant variable which must be included in tha model
when the impact of learning is to be estimated.
2.1.3 Production H ate and Dual Sourcinq
Some analysts maintain that since dual sourcing divides the
procurement quantity between two sources, it forc=s suppli-
ers to forgo the economies of large scale production. As a
result, unit costs necessarily rise. Inherent in this ob-
servation is an assumption that the sols-source contractor's
capacity is currently underutilized and that any further re-
duction in production quantity (as a result of second sourc-
ing) will drive the unit cost up along tha curve--away from
the optimal production quantity. This issumption may or may
not be true, the reason will become clear as we discuss the
results of prior empirical works later in this section.
A major point to be raised here regarding the production
rate impact on unit cost is the shapa of the production
rate/cost curve. Most empirical works do recognize that a
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U-shaped curv9 exists, but the mods Is actually ussd by the
analysts to capture the impacts of production rates on cos-
have usually net conformed to a O-shaped formulation. 3emis
and Fargher [not dated. See also Homer, 1979; Berais, 1980;
Cox and Gansler, 1981.], for example, use the following mod-
el in empirical curve fitting:
Y = AX
where: Y = unit cost of product
A = a constant
X = production rate
(annual buy in the example)
b = exponent describing the slope
or the rate/cost curve
The eguation represents an ever-decreasing unit cost when
the production rate increases. The value found for b in
Berais and Fargher's study was -0.19, wnich corresponds to a
slope of approximately 87.7% for the rate/cost curve. Fig-





+ + + + + + + + + +--Units
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Figure 2.2: Ever-Decreasing Rate/Cost Curve
However, an ever-decreasing rate/cost curve may be a rea-
sonable representation of reality if a firm has a great deal
of idls capacity. But is this a reasonable assumption for
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the general case? Carrick's [1982] interviews with five
Army contractors provide some clues. Hi noted that ccmi
original developer/contractors and sud con tnctcio have in-
vested in facilities to support production ratis far in ex-
cess of the actual utilization of those facilities. The
Government sometimes is responsible for the the existence of
excess capacity because of program cutbacks or str etch-outs.
A program stretch-out increases overhead allocations which,
in turn, may cause price adjustments.
Two recent analyses (TASC) [See, particularly Kratz, et
al., not dated. ] have in fact mad^ the important advance of
using U-shaped curves. Hcwever, their examples showed only
a curve that was symmetrical, in shap?, as seen in Figure
2. 3.
Figure 2.3: Symmetrical a-Shaped Sate/Cost Curve
i
The major reason for assuming a symmetrical curve was con-
venience, since a single production rate parameter can be
aided to the conventional learning curve modal to reflect
the impact of both learning and rate en price. The follow-
ing eguaticn expresses their U-shaped model mathematically:
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b c
Z = AX Y
where: Z = unit pries of the Xth item produced
A = first unit price
X = cumulative production quantity
b = coefficient of the learning factor
Y = Rate (R) if R < Ro (optimal rate) , but
Y = 2Ro - R (if Re < B < 2Ro - 1) .
c = exponent describing the slope of the
rate/cost curve.
Using this equation, Kratz, et al., reported the pries reac-
tions attributable to a change in production rats. Of the
11 programs analyzed, nine have a parameter value of less
than 100% and two programs (Bullpup AGJi-123 and TOW) have
values slightly above 100X. The parameter values vary wide-
ly, ranging frcm a low of 75. 4& to a high of 100. 7%, w it h a
mean of 90.3%. Similar wide variations in these values were
reported by Smith [1976].
2.1.3.1 Weaknesses
As is the case with ever-decreasing terms, there are major
deficiencies associated with assuming a symmetrical shape
for the rate/cost curve. First, the optimal production rate
must be accurately determined, otherwise errors may occur in
both the magnitude and direction cf cost changes. Second,
changes in cost when the production rate is below the most
efficient level may well be different from those which occur
when the plant operates above its most efficient point. The
former typically are the result cf amortization of fixed
costs over an increased number of production units, while
the latter are usually the result of adding costs to
"stretch" capacity.
2.1.3.2 Actual Bate Bffects
We concur with the TASC analysts' observation that, in real-
ity, the effect of production rate on unit cost may take
several forms, depending on the peculiarities of an individ-
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ua 1 production line. We feel compelled to add, however,
that no analysis to date has considered the effects of ca-
pacity utilization, which constitutes an important over-
sight, or has traced the cost /utilization curve for any
firm. The optimal production rate and the shape of the
curve will in fact vary from one contractor to another and,
for the same contractor, from period to period. A model
that allows the shape and slope to vary from cas? to case
would be preferable.
2.1.4 Prod uction Rate measure m ent
How should we measure the production rate for cost sstiaa-
tion purposes? The ideal approach would be to observe the
contractor's actual production schedule. Womer's study
[1979] is based on an attempt (not really successful) to ob-
tain the needed data. Virtually all other studies iealing
with the production rate use lat: size, t ) produce an approxi-
mation of the production rate. Given the lack of detailed
production rate data, the use of lot size io^s seem to be a
reasonable choice for researchers. Practicing analysts may
be able to do better. The implication for the program man-
ager is that the government should require contractors to
explain as part of their proposals the mechanisms for acco-
modating production rate changes. This point will be dis-
cussed in greater detail in another chapter.
2.2 SECOHD-sgOHCE START-DP COST
To introduce a second source for a major weapon system, ad-
ditional investment over and above what would be necessary
for a sole-source award is required. An experienceed pro-
gram manager is aware of the many problems that may arise in
transferring a complex production technology, and of the ad-
ditional costs which must be incurred to set up and manage a
competitive production environment. It is difficult and ex-
pensive to get a good technical data package (TDP) for the
second contractor, and even more difficult to persuade the
first producer to pass alcng to a competitor the benefits of
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his manufacturing experience. A reviaw of prior empirical
works, however, reveals that a surprisingly large number of
studies have ignored the investment cost in analyzing ths
benefits from competition.
2. 2. 1 Second-Source Sta rt-D p Costs as an Investment
There are two reasons for considering the front-end cost of
introducing a second source when making the seconi-sourcirg
decision. First, the front-end costs are immediate and dis-
tinct. Unless the needed funding is specifically provid-d
by Congress, program cut-tacks or stretch-outs may be neces-
sary to create the second source. The second reason for
considering the investment cost is that the benefits from
competition are long-term and uncertain. In the case of ma-
jor weapon systems, the savings from introducing competition
may not begin to accrue until several years after the ini-
tial investment is made. Therefore, it is important to take
into account the opportunity cost of using Government funds
for the front-end investment.
Among the studies reviewed, only three have taken into
account the time value of money [Daly, et al
.
, 1979; Archi-
bald, et al. r 1981; Beltramo and Jordan, 1982]. Failure to
consider the front-end investment and the time value of mon-
9y hav= given rise to unwarranted measurements of the magni-
tude of the n et savings which may be brought about by compe-
tition. Archibald, et al. [198 1], for example, say that if
the in-house and external costs of introducing competition
were taken intc acount, and if costs and savings were, duly
discounted at the 10% rate suggested by 3M3, the 13.7% mean
GROSS savings on all post-competition production for the
APRO-78 study's sample of 16 items, the net savings would in
fact have been negative. Thus, the four systems examined in
the APRO-79 study (750 lb. Bomb, M223 Fuze, 3489 Projectile,
and M103 Cartridge Case) do not seem to generate sufficient
savings frca split award competition to satisfy the 10% re-
turn reguired by OMB.
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2.2.2 Elements of Second-Source Start-Op Cost.
There is general agr=ement among analysts that the invest-
ment cost of introducing a second source should include all
nonrecurring incremental costs necessary to qualify the new
supplier as a competitive producer. We can classify these
incremental costs in five general categories.
Tfre cost of tec hnologica l transfe r : this catego-ry in-
cludes costs paid by the Government to the original develop-
er/producer for assisting the new source, such as prepara-
tion of the technical data package, proprietary rights in
data, engineering and technical service.
Special t qcl inq, ^l§tin£ and production eaui pjn ent : any
additional unique facilities and special test equipment pro-
vided by the Government to the new source, as well as those
acquired by the contractor, must be considered as part of
the cost of introducing a second source.
Extra cost of ed ucational buy_s: ths Government must in-
cur extra cost for awarding learning buys until +-he second
source becomes price competitive. Note that the original
source may also charge the Government a higher price due to
the reduced quantities.
A dministrative costs to the Government : in addition to
purchasing the technical data package and contracting with
the oringial source to assist the new source, the government
also will incur in-house administrative costs to select the
second source, verify the TDP, assist with technology trans-
fer, qualify the new source, and administer the competition.
Logistics costs: the second source will most likely pro-
duce an end product which is somewhat different from that of
the first source, either in design or components, even if
both products are identical in performance. Extra logistics
cost is inevitable if there is a difference between the two
end items.
Some analysts also argue that the TDP tends to be inade-
quate for the second source either because the original sup-
plier is unwilling to help the competitor or the technology
is firm-specific. As a result, the investment cost may be
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underestimated because the second source may encounter dif-
ficulty with the TDP and ask for additional compensation at
a later date. Costs such as these are mainly a result of
inadequate planning rather than a tangible item one must
deal with before a second-sourcing decision is made.
2. 2. 3 Estimating S eco nd Source Start-ap Costs
The cost of introducing a second source tends to be rathsr
situation specific, because it consists of a wide variety of
cost items which reguire estimation on an item by item ba-
sis. This may be one of the major reasons why prior empiri-
cal studies have most often looked at the gross savings from
competition, even though analysts are aware of the need to
consider this one-time frcnt-end cost.
Before we proceed to discuss the estimation methods for
individual start-up cost items, a distinction should b~ made
between the cost to be borne by the government and the cost
incurred by the contractor. The former is an investment of
government funds which, as mentioned earlier, must be justi-
fied with a 10% return. The latter will be reflected in the
price cf the contractor's product and, therefore, should be
considered when estimating the second source's price propo-
sal. The effect on future price depends on the magnitude as
well as the p e rc eiv ed production quantities over which they
are to be amortized. Myers, et al. [1932], suggest that the
proper treatment of nonrecurring costs borne by the contrac-
tor is to compute the estimated unit nonrecurring costs us-
ing a capital recovery factor applicable to the length of
the contract and a "prevailing" interest rate, but a more
realistic and theoretically preferable criterion would be to
use the contractor's cost of capital. A firm presumably
will attempt to earn, at the minimum, the average rate of
return experienced by the firm. Therefore, the higher f
the CMB interest rate or the contractor's average rate of
return on investment may be the more reasonable rate for
discounting.
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As to the portion of the s?ccnd-sour:5 start-up costs to
be borne by the government, we will examine each cost cat-
egory individually. Logistics costs--The second source will
most likely produce
2.2.3.1 Cost of Technology Transfer
As mentioned earlier, costs in this general category include
(a) the TDF, (b) data rights, (c) contracted technical as-
sistance by the original source, and (d) the Government's
in-house technical assistance. The complexity of the weapon
system determines the size of this category of start-up
costs. The first three represent payments by the government
to the original developer/producer and are usually negotiat-
ed with the contractor. Therefore, the estimated costs have
to come from the negotiator rather than from a mathematical
eguation [Daly, et al. , 1979]. The price of giving up a
proprietary data position (the original producer's quasi-
monopclistic position) is included at this stage, and is
difficult to estimate prior to negotiation. HcKie maintains
that the upper limit should be the lower of two cos*s to the
buyer [ 1966]: (a) the cost of reverse sagineering, and (b)
the cost of developing alternative designs.
As to the Government's in-house technical assistance to
the second source, one may argue that, unless the cost is
incremental to the Government, it represents a sunk cost
and is irrelevant to the investment decision. However, in-
asmuch as the the use of in-house technical staff represents
the use of governmental resources, there is an opportunity
cost involved. Therefore, it should be considered an in-
vestment, and a reasonable return is warranted. Our talks
with program office personnel indicate that this is estima-
ble on a case-by-case basis.
2.2.3.2 Special Tooling, Test, Production Equipment
This is often the largest single element of investment cost
required to establish a second source. Two ways of estimat-
ing the tooling and test equipment cost have been suggested.
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The first aethcd is to base the estimate on the original
producer's cost. The IDA 79 study cited the opinion of a
cost analyst that the cost of special tooling and test
equipment is about 80% of the amount incurred by the origi-
nal source, but available data do not allow generalization
of this estimate [Daly, et al., 1979], However, it is prob-
ably safe to say that the cost to facilitate t he second
source should be less than for the original source. To de-
termine a more specific number, however, requires that an-
other issue first be resolved: at what level should the
second source be facilitized? Results of interviews with
program managers and contractor personnel indicate that the
original source's production capacity tends to be far in ex-
cess of actual needs [Carrick, 1982]. k second source, if
determined to be desirable, is most likely to be sized to
some production rate smaller than the original source.
Therefore, if production capacity is a cjuestion, estimating
tooling and test equipment cost must take into consideration
both the complexity of the system and the production capaci-
ty.
The second method calls for using "cost estimating rela-
tionships" (CERs) , which relate the cost of tooling and test
equipment to the production race and hardware costs. Hard-
ware cost is interpreted as a proxy of a measure of system
complexity. The CERs developed by the Naval Weapon Center
are as follows [Beltramo and Jordan, 1932]:
1.13 0.44
T = 0. 0131C R
where: T = tooling and test equipment cost
C = cumulative average recurring hardware
cost for 1,000 units, and
R = monthly production rate.
i
The estimate provided by this formula would be very rough,
of course, but it represents a ballpark figure which the ac-
quisition managers may revise according to more specific in-
formation. The formula would also be subject to further re-
finement as more data become available for anslysis.
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2.2.3.3 Extra Cost of Educational Buys
Educational buys are normally required for the second source
to become a competitive supplier. The cost to --he Govern-
ment may not be limited to the higher production cost of ths
second source before it becomes competitive. Because of the
reduced buy from the first source, the Government may also
pay a higher price to the first source. Note that until the
second source become competitive, the first source has no
reason to reduce the price to meet competition. The extra
costs due to the need to award educational buys may be rep-
resented by the difference between the total pric~ of hard-
ware paid by the government to both sources until competi-
tive bidding is held, and the total price that would have
been paid had the first source remained the sole source.
There are three unknown variables involved in this computa-
tion: the first source's price reduction carve, the produc-
tion-rate/cost curve of the second source, and the size of
educational buys. The first two will be discussed in great-
er detail later in this chapter. The quantity of learning
buys will be discussed now.
The second source must require only a fraction of the
volume produced by the original source to reach price parity
if it is to become a viable competitor. The IDA 79 study
reports the experience of four missile systems regarding the
size of educational buys, as shown in Table 2.1 [Daly, et
al., 1979].
Based on these data, and input from program office per-
sonnel, we may say that a percentage ratio in the high 20's
may be on the conservative side. A few second sources have
become competitive right at the outset, but the possibility
of having an instantly competitive second source must be
considered an exception rather than the rule. However, if
the acquisition manager has advance knowledge of such a pos-
sibility, there is no reason why price estimation should not
take advantage of this information.








Bullpup 37,032 4,438 12%
Shillelagh 17,945 4,960 28%






2.2.3.4 Administrative Costs to the Govern mnet
Although acquisition managers are generally aware that addi-
tional administrative costs are inevitable when a second
contractor is brought into the program, the vast majority of
empirical works dealing with the costs and benefits of com-
petition ignore these costs. There ar? at least two expla-
nations for the omission. First, costs in this category are
not reported separately by the Government ani, therefore,
are not easily identifible for analysis. Second, some ad-
ministrative costs are incremental in nature while others
are opportunity costs; an accurate account of opportunity
costs requires a detailed analysis which, in all fairness,
the analyst may not be in the best position to perform un-
less he or she is an especially knowlelgeable member of the
program office.
Estimating the additional administrative costs can proba-
bly best be done on a case-by-case, item-by-item basis. In
view of the fact that a significant proportion of the costs
in this category represents personnel, perhaps it is wise to
define clearly the incre mental administrative cost. Some
cost items, such as testing and qualification of the second
source's output, are incremental, or out-of-pocket. Under a
straightforward definition of incremental cost, the cost of
using in-house personnel represents the use of existing re-
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sources. It. may therefore be considerad a sunk cost . On
the ether hand, if the use of in-house personnel precludes
their availability for other programs, there is an opportu-
nity cost and therefore it should be treated as an incremen-
tal cost. One must keep this difference in mind in estimat-
ing the additional administrative cost that might be
required.
There is general agreement on the items to be included in
the category of administrative costs. rhey are:
I
'• preparation of solicitation (SFP) ,
I I:
additional proposal costs,
additional costs of evaluating the price propo-
1
sal ty the second source,
1 4.
i
testing and gualif ication of the second
source's first unit,
5. additional personnel to coordinate the changes
affecting the twe suppliers.
6. extra testing and verification of delivered
product, and
7. ether miscellaneous additional costs such as
negotiation and preparation of the additional
contract, additional audit, pre-award survey,
and production readiness reviews.
Some of these costs are one-time costs while others are re-
curring. As mentioned earlier, costs in this category have
been- omitted in prior guantitative studies. Therefore,
there is no indication as to the magnitude of these costs.
2.2.3.5 Logistics Costs
None of the empirical studies reviewed considered the extra
cost that may have to be incurred if the products supplied
by different sources are not identical. Logistics costs in-
clude the costs of maintaining two sets of spare parts if
they are different, the cost of having different repair fa-
cilities and technical personnel, and related support costs.
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The costs of these items are probably impossible to estimate
with precision before the second source is select ed. Ev^n
once the second source is selected, estimating the logistics
cost may be difficult, as it depends on just how different
the end products will beccme. Nevertheless, the extra lo-
gistics costs are very real and may be significant. Hhen
making a decision on second sourcing, some provision for it,
no matter how rough, is essential.
2. 3 SECOSD-SOPBCE FIRST-PIECE PRICE
When a second source is to be introduced during the produc-
tion phase, two important questions arise. First, what will
the "first unit price" be for the second source? Second,
how steep will the second source's price-reduction curve be?
These two questions are important as they affect the quanti-
ty of educational buys which must be awarded to the second
source before the second source can bsoome truly price com-
petitive. Answers to these questions are also essential
when estimating the potential for savings in recurring costs
once the competition starts. In this section, we will con-
centrate on the second source's first-unit price. The slope
of the price-reduction curve will be addressed in the next
section.
2. 3. 1 factors con tributing to Fir st-Pi ece Price
It is common for the second source to have a lower first
unit price than the initial source did. Several factors may
contribute to this difference.
First, the initial producibi lity problems may have been
solved by the original source and the TDP enables the second
source to avoid the same problems, at least partially.
Also, the second source has the advantage of using subcon-
tractors developed by the first source, and benefits from
their learning. Third, the second source is likely to have
a more realistic expectation of the total quantity, and
therefore more accurate knowledge of the level of facilita-
tion required for efficient production. Other factors in-
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elude more stabilized product design, technological advanc-
es, and the competitive pressure inhsrsnt in having two
sources.
2. 3. 2 Estiaating First-Piece Price
Although the impact of the above mentioned factors or. the
second source's first unit price cannot be Measured direct-
ly, surrogate measures have b?en attempted by several ana-
lysts. In the IEA 79 study, Daly, et al. [1979] assume that
the second source is able to start production at a pric =
equal to the second un it produced by the original source.
This assumption, of course, is based on the view that som =
of the original source's learning (from producing tne first
unit) is transferred to the second souroe.
The IDA 74 study considers both tha learning slope and
the cumulative production quantity of the original source in
attempting to predict the second source's first unit price
[Zusman, et al., 1974], Based on a few selected programs,
an equation for the second source's first-piece price is de-
rived. However, the model is not sufficiently gen-ral to be
useful to the practitioner. Unless all the observations
used to derive a specific equation are of homogeneous units
of product, and are the same as for the intended applica-
tion, the result will be misleading.
The impact of nonhomogeneous units of product on the sec-
ond source's first unit price is shown by Cox and Gansler
[1981]. For very complex systems, such as a guided missile
frigate, the price of the first piece produced by the second
source exceeded that of the initial source by approximately
9%. For the five tactical missiles examined, the first
piece price from the second source was, on the average, 25%
less than the first unit price of the original source. For
electronic subsystems and components, the second source won
the competition without learning guantitias or educational
buys in the majority of cases, implying that the second
source became competitive right at the beginning of produc-
tion phase.
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2. 4 EFFECTS CF CO H PETITION ON LEARNING RATES AND PRICES
As mentioned above, the ability to estimate the affects of
competition on price redaction rates is essential in deter-
mining the quantity of educational buys and the amount of
potential savings in recurring unit cost. It is generally
expected that the unit price of products will drop under
competitive pressure. The size of the expected savings may
be a function cf three factors:
1. a one-time, probably immediate, reduction in
unit price when competition begins--* he so-
called "shift,"
2. a continuous, or sustained reduction in price
because of a steeper pri^ e-reduction curve
("rotatisn") , and
3. a change in unit production costs because of
the reduced production rate.
The impact of production rates has been discussed earlier.
In this section, we will address the issue of estimating the
shift and rotation of price-reduction curves when competi-
tion is introduced.
2.4.1 Satirical Studies of "Shift"
A one-time reduction in unit price after competition is in-
troduced may be the result of two factors. The contractor
may shift to lower cost inputs, or he may adopt more effi-
cient production technology. If cost reduction is not pos-
sible, there may be a reduction in profit. This downward
"shift" in price is widely observed. However, no researcher
has ever been able to pinpoint whether the "shift" is the
result of profit reduction or production cost reduction.
Myers, et al. emphasize the need far this distinction
[1982].
This raises another issue. Could efforts to maximize
savings in a program reduce a contractor's profit to a point
such that the DoD market becomes so unattractive as to ef-
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fectively drive off suppliers? The profitability issue will
be deferred until later in this report. For now, we will
concentrate on the reduction in unit price, regardless of
the source of the reduction.
A rather dramatic downward shift in price was reported by
Yuspeh [1976], and in the 1972 Army Electronics Command
study [U.S. Army, 1972]. These studies, however, shar^ a
common methodological flaw. The last sola-source price was
compared directly with the competitiva price to calculate
the reduction in price, without considering the affect of
learning. The IDA 74 study also attributes a significant
amount of savings (37%) to competition [Zusman, et al.,
1974]. However, almost all of the subject items were sub-
mitted in the formally advertized IFB style of competition
with more than two bidders. Therefore, the findings are net
particularly relevant to program managers in charge of dual
sourcing advanced weapon systems.
Results from the APRO 78 and 79 stadias deserve closer
examination [ Lovett and Norton, 1973; 3ranr.on, at al.,
1979]. The AERO 78 study looked at 16 items with unit val-
ues ranging from less than $1,000 to over $50,000 and found
an average price reduction of 13.7%. A regression equation
was constructed from the data which indicates that the actu-
al unit price (AUP) of competitive procurements can b=
prdicted with the following:
.
Log (AUP) = 0.967118 Log (PUP) - 0.226109 Log (ROQ)
where: AUP = actual competitive unit price,
PUP = projected unit price on the
sole-scurce price reduction curve,
BOQ " ratio cf quantity procured after
competition to total program
quantity.
Since APRO researchers tend to take the position that the
competitive slope -fill be the same as sole source slope, any
reduction in price must be interpreted as due to a one-time,
downward "shift."
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A word of caution is in order before ana attempts to use
this equation to estimate competitive savings. Most of the
subject items in the study were relatively unsophisticated,
and virtually all were competed en winner-take-all or buy-
out basis.
Using essentially the same methodology as APRO 78, the
APRO 79 study examined four systems with a total of 22 mul-
tiple-source and winner-take-all acquisitions. The average
raduction in unit price for the 22 acquisitions was 7.1)5 r
indicating that the "shift" in multiple source award situ-
ations may not be as pronounced as with *inner-tak e-all com-
petition.
The magnitude of downward "shift" reported by TASC re-
searchers averaged around 10% [Cox and Sansler, 1981; Kratz,
et al., not dated].
2.4.2 Empiri cal Studies of "Ro tatio n"
Along with the one-time reduction in unit price, this poten-
tial source of competitive savings constitutes the main ob-
jective of most empirical works attempting to estimate the
impact of price competition in defense procurement. Unfor-
tunately, the results are controversial.
Analysts* views on the rotation of price-reduction curves
may be classified into two groups: (a) those rfho expect
that the sole source slope will be essentially unchanged,
ia.; the same curve will apply to both sources, and (2)
those who believe that the post-competition slope will be
steeper than the pre-competition slope.
APRO researchers tend to assume that any impact of compe-
tition on the price-reduction rate should be negligible. As
a result, they extrapclate the original sole source's
price-reduction rates to competitive procurement situations.
The APRO 78 and 79 studies [Lovett and Norton, 1978; Bran-
non, et al., 1S79], and APRO's analysis of the IDA 79 study
[Arvis, 1980] clearly reflect this viaw. Smith and Lowe
[1982], also APRO researchers, found in their study that the
competitive price-reduction rates tend to be steeper (but
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not significanty so in a statistical sense), but that ^-here
is no correlation between co mpetitiva and sols source
price-reduction curve slopes. Other analyses following this
assumption include Army Missile Command's analysis of MRLS
second-sourcing decision [U.S. Army, 1980] and Science Ap-
plications Inc.'s study of AIAAM saconl sourcing decisions
[Beltraao and Jordan, 1982].
The IDA 79' s attempt tc develop a savings prediction mod-
el differed significantly from other comprehensive empirical
studies [Daly, et al., 1979]. The attempt was to predict
the slope of the price-reduction curve, on the basis of a
linear regression, from the slope of the known sole-source
price-reduction curve. However, the results snow the two
slopes to be unc orr e lat ed. This left i he researchers having
to use the mean of the competitive slopes to predict the ef-
fect cf competition on price-reduction rates. The average
competitive slope found by Daly, et al., is 75%. If we use
a "typical" scle-source slope of 87% (an average of those
found by APHO 78, IDA 79, and Kratz, et al. ), wa may infer
that the average rotation of slope of the price-reduction
curve after ccirpetition is introduced is approximately 12%.
One should keep in mind, however, that the items examined in
these studies are mostly simple, unsophisticated systems or
electronic items.
Cox and Gansler's analysis [1931] suggests a relationship
between the complexity of a system and the rotation of the
price improvement curve cf a second source. It was found
that the slope of the second source was approximately 4%
steeper than that of the first source for the guided missile
frigate and 5% for tactical missiles. Their data did not
permit computation of price-reduction curve parameters for
electronic items.
2.4.3 Are Shift and Bot ation P redictable?
As mentioned earlier, the rotation and shift of price-reduc-
tion curves have been the most controversial issues in the
anslysis of competitive savings. None of the studies re-
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viewed aoove was able to develop a reliable predic-.iv- model
to determine the magnitude of shift and rotation of the
price reduction curve for individual procurements. Although
Cox and Gansler were able to suggest a different impact of
competition amcng items of different complexity, their find-
ings far froB constitute a predictive model. rising the
means of slopes to predict gross competitive savings has
many weaknesses.
The IDA 79 researchers realized the futility of their at-
tempt and stated:
The reduction in unit price is the most difficult
component to forecast. It is in fact likely that
no precise and stable predictive relationship ex-
ists; there are so many dimensions of variations
surrounding each procurement (e.g., technology,
market conditions) that each systaa is to a con-
siderable extent unique.
Experience with previous systems reveals consider-
able variation in the realized gross savings in
unit prices after competition [Daly, et al., 1979:
83].
To illustrate the sensitivity to various assumptions of the
estimated savings attributed to the introduction of competi-
tion, Daly, et al., developed stylized examples in Appendix
F of their report.
SAI analysts raised an issue which has not been addressed
in prior empirical works. The issue relates to pricing
strategies available to contractors. Onca the Government
reveals its intent to compete a system, the sole-source con-
tractor may respond to the impending competition by raising
its price so as to maximize profit while it can [Beltramo
and Jordan, 1982]. Under this circumstance, estimating the
economic effects of competition most likely will overstate
the size of any available savings. This is the predictable
result if the sole source contractor exercises such gaming
strategy, which is a distinct possibility.
2.4.4 "Optiaal" L e a rn i n q Curves
TASC researchers developed an "optimal learning curve," or
"best competitive curve," which is a continuous price im-
provement curve beginning with the noncompetitive first unit
price and achieving parity with the last competitive unit
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price [Cox and Gansler, 1981; Kratz, et al., not dated]. It
represents what "might have been" had the original producer
been under continuous competitive pressure from the outset.
They state that the difference between the sole-source
price-reduction curve and this "optimum" curve is the possi-
ble savings frcm introducing competition.
While the TASC researchers' hypothesis seems correct in
theory, it ignores some of the reality of procuring advanced
weapon systems. k necessary assumption for this "optimum"
curve to be realistic is that the two sources a: a competi-
tive at the outset--which is rather anlikely unless both
sources are equal partners at the systems development stage,
and neither has an edge over the other in production experi-
ence. In almost all competitions, the developer has a
built-in advantage over other sources. Indeed, this is the
reason for having learning buys before split award competi-
tion is held. Until the original sou roe perceives that the
second source is economically ready to compete, he still en-
joys an advantageous position.
2.4.5 Pricing Str ategy Effects
We may categorize an original source's pricing strategy us-
ing three different scanerios (see Figure 2.4). First, the
contractor may try to make a constant percentage of profit
by pricing the item according to his "true" cost function,
as depicted by the line LC1.
But if the Government has not decided whether to compete
the system, he may elect the "penetration pricing" strategy.
This strategy calls for purposely pricing the items low at
the outset to hold at bay possible competitors until it is
too late for a competitor to enter the market; then he can
reverse the pricing strategy and enjoy the benefits of his
sole source position. LC2 depicts this scenerio, which is
essentially the same as the second-source strategy widely
known in defense procurement circles as a "buy-in."
Finally, the contractor may have anticipated that the
Government will compete the system, for whatever reason.








Figure 2.4: Different Pricinj Strategies
Under ihis circumstance, a likely pricing strategy is "skim-
ming," in which the contractor sets a high initial price to
maximize profit, progressively lowering the price when nec-
essary to lead competitor as long as he can. This is simi-
lar to the behavior hypothesized by the SAI researchers.
To illustrate, let us assume that a second source has
been selected by the Government, and that the first unit
price is lower than was the first source's, but that the
second source is not immediately competitive. Let us fur-
ther assume that the second source's pries reduction curve
is slightly steeper than the first source's, as shown by
LCN. The first source's pricing path may be as depicted by
LC3, which is characterized by a series of downward shifts
(or rotations, or both) until the line lies close to the
cost curve.
Of course, defense contractors do not have unlimited
pricing flexibility. The Defense Contract Audit Agency and
the Defense Acquisition Regulations impose seme restrictions
on the contractor's pricing flexibility. However, there are
some legitinate accounting liberties that can significantly
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change the "ccst" of an item at any poiiit in its production
life without defying the regulations. (Sea Chapter 4.)
2.5 OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
The decision to introduce a second source for a major weapon
system requires a prospective evaluation of the financial
consequences as well as a wide variety of other factors
which, by nature, do not easily lend themselves to quanti-
fied analysis. The rich literature en competition in DoD
procurement covers a wide spectrum of factors and variables
to be considered by the decision maker. In this section, we
will discuss seme of the more salient issues.
2. 5. 1 Barriers to Compe tition
Despite the general belief that price competition often re-
sults in savings, and the formal commitment by DoD to use
this procurement technique whenever it is possible, only a
relatively minor fraction of its procurement dollars ara ex-
pended under competitive conditions. There are institution-
al factors as well as industry characteristics which inhibit
the use of competition.
2.5.1.1 Institional Barriers
Archibald, et al., conducted a series of interviews with DoD
people involved in designing and carrying out acquisition
strategy in their program offices [1981]. The institutional
barriers to competition, as perceived by senior program ac-
quisition personnel, may be summarized under three headings:
1. Additional time and money needed j
2. Extra management complexity and effort required i
i
.





The magnitude of funding needed for introducing a compet-
itive second source tends to be large for advanced weapon
systems. When substantial amounts of money are involved,
the DoD and Congress must be sold on tha competition. In
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fact, the required front-end funding may as so significant
chat it may be necessary to compete with another program's
very survival in order tc obtain the necessary funding.
Congress tends to dislike programs with heavy front-end
cost. Money for competitive development programs tends to
be a prime target during a budget squeeze.
Competition also tends to slow a program down because of
the time involved in source selection, testing and qualifi-
cation of a second source. This may be a disincentive to
competition because there is usually a strong desire to de-
ploy the system as rapidly as possible. In addition, there
is a risk that the cost may rise, rather than fall, as a re-
sult of competition.
The extra management effort stems from two sources.
First, if a competition is to be beneficial, considerable
planning fcr the competitive steps is necessary, which in-
cludes the reguest for proposal (RFP) and the usual compli-
cations and precautions that go with it. Acquiring a good
TDP is also difficult and expensive. If in-house capability
to develop a TDP is not available, judging its adequacy is
also difficult.
Program managers have also expressed concern that poli-
cies which put tec m uch press ure on contraotcrs may run the
risk of driving one of the contractors out of the program,
leaving the old sole-source environment after all the work
and expense of gualifying the second contractor. This con-
cern seems to reflect a view that defense business may be
less attractive to contractors than commercial business. tfe
will present evidence to support this view in a later chap-
ter.
Finally, apart from exhortations in policy documents and
the "conventional wisdom" that competition is a good pro-
curement technique, there are few real incentives for intro-
ducing competition. The costs of competition are short-term
and clear, while the benefits are long-term and uncertain.
Furthermore, price reductions are difficult to prove and to
measure, and may be at least partially masked by inflation.
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Given a typical tenure of thr ee years, a program manager is
unlikely to be around to receive the credit for any benefits
that finally materialize.
2.5.1.2 Industry Barriers
The (domestic) defense market is composed of a single buyer
and a few potential suppliers. Particularly in the case cf
major weapon systems, attempts to bring competition into a
program may re hampered by entry barriers existing in the
industry. Most discussions of industry barriers have been
anecdotal in nature. Our literature review did not uncover
any systematic study attempting to analyze how barriers af-
fect the Government's attempt to use prioe competition.
Entry barriers have been found in some studies to be re-
lated to the profitability of defense work. The profitabil-
ity issue has been the subject of at least two comprehensive
research projects .'General Accounting Office, 1969; Profit
Study Group, 1976 ].
We feel a more relevant contemporary guestion is whether
industry perceives defense business to be aora or less at-
tractive than commercial business. In the final analysis,
it is the number of firms attracted to the defense market
that will determine the vigor of any competition which might
be achieved through dual sourcing, or by any other means.
Gansler, for example, cited one instance in which the 1974
Congressional action doubling tank orders ran into trouble
because the only qualified supplier of steel castings ref-
used to supply them when he found commercial business of-
fered a more profitable use cf his facilities [1980].
There seems also to be common complaint of an adversarial
attitude among some defense buyers. To understand this at-
titude, one must examine the relationship between production
costs, profits and prices in the defensa business. Oaly, et
al., maintain that while the lack of competition may create
a possibility of very high races of return for contractors,
part or all of this potential return is absorbed by larger
than necessary costs [1979].
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Why are defense contractors not made to be efficient?
The simple existence of inefficiency loas not assure the
Government that competition will eliminate it. Ganslar says
that the defense industry is in reality regulated, and that
detailed government intervention is grossly inefficient and
freguently self-defeating [1980].
A pure, free market economy does not and probably can net
exist in this environment cf a single buyer and a small num-
ber of suppliers. Sellers observed, for example, that un-
used plant capacity was particularly high among firms with a
high government/low commercial mix [1979]. The need for am-
ple capacity may partly be attributad to the amount of ca-
pacity reguired to "win the contract," and partly to the
need for "surge" capacity. Idle capacity, however, discour-
ages investors and lenders, making it difficult for a firm
to obtain financing. Unused capacity also inflates the cost
of existing defense work, adding to the prise the Government
must pay. Therefore, while the profitability of defense
work may net be high, the price paid by the Government is
not necessarily low.
As one would expect, a contractor does not welcome compe-
tition. If the cooperation of the first source is needed to
bring a second source on board, it is rather unlikely that
the first source will give full support. Reports of inade-
guate TDP's are freguent. The consequences are potential
claims by the second source for deficiencies in the IDP, and
a delay in achieving cost parity by the second source. The
contractor teaming approach used in the Joint Cruise Missile
Program may remove this barrier by not creating a monopoly
situation during the development phase.
2.5.2 Threat of Coape tition
Next to actual introduction of a second source, the threat
of competition may be the best strategy the Government has
available for controlling the prices of a sole source sup-
plier [Beltramc and Jordan, 1982]. Thsre is evidence that,
even in cases where the second source never succeeds in pro-
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ducing a usuable product, the pressure of potential competi-
tion on the first contractor still makes ths effort worth-
while [Baumbusch, 1977], However, a threat of competition
will be most effective only whan certain conditions are met.
First, the Government must clearly own the lata rights need-
ed for technology transfer. Second, technologically capable
suppliers must have sufficient capacity to be willing to
compete.
One should note that a threat will not be effective for
the entire length of a system's production phase. The rea-
son is that once production is so far iown the road that it
would no longer be practical to introdu-e competition, the
sole-source supplier will ignore the threat and revert to a
sole-source pricing strategy. This scenario is similar in
effect to the "penetration pricing" strategy depicted by LC2
in Figure 2.4.
2.5.3 Qualitative Benefits of Com petition
Apart from generating lower recurring unit prices, there may
be other significant benefits from introducing competition.
Virtually every study dealing with the issue of price compe-
tition in DoD acquisition has discussed other benefits. We
will simply list the more significant ones without addition-
al discussion:
"




















5. flora equitable acquisition processes
1
1
6. Sore rapid technological progress
J
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2. 5- 4 Negative Aspects of Comp etition
Given the general wisdom that price competition is benefi-
cial to the buyer and the official commitment to employ tha
technique whan possible, it is not surprising to find that:
few negative aspects of competition are discussed in tha
literature. But this does not mean they do not exist.
Apart from the need for a significant amount of front-end
investment, the most notable disadvantages of having two
suppliers are the logistic problems and the added complexity
in contract management. Another nsgativa factor is the fact
that the investment is short-term and olear while the pay-
back is long-term and uncertain. These factors have been
addressed earlier in this chapter.
Also, dual sourcing necessarily divides the quantity to
be procured between two suppliers. 2ther things be ing
Saii^l, the lower lot size can increase unit cost for two
reasons. If the contractor has excess capacity, a reduced
demand level means the fixed costs must be born by fewer
units of output. Reduced quantity alsD means that the con-
tractor will not ride as far down the learning curve as
would have been the case had he remained a sole producer
with a larger quantity. On the other hand, if the sole
source producer does not have sufficient capacity (for what-
ever reason) to produce the needed quantity without expand-
ing, a reduction in the production rata could be beneficial
to the Government.
Under dual sourcing, the high bidder is usually awarded a
minimum sustaining quantity to maintain his competitive po-
sition. This guarranted quantity creatas an opprotunity for
profit maximization if one or both contractors have no de-
sire to win the larger quantity. This pricing behavior has
been observed in a number of dual souroad systems. It is
apparent that price estimation models must take into account
the different gaming strategies employed by contractors un-
der different circumstances.
Finally, too much competitive pressure may drive off com-
petitors, leaving the Government in the sole source environ-
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ment again. A reduction in costs to the Government will oe
possible only if the contractor is willing and able to cut
costs or profit, or both.
2, 5. 5 Hecessar v. Requirements f or Competition
Some basic requirements exist which should be met before em-
barking on any second-sourcing efforts. Some of these re-
quirements have been discussed earlier i.i this chapter. In
this section we will summarize the general, ncnquantitat ive
conditions which are conducive to successful price competi-
tion [Lamm, 1S78; Nelson, 1980; flyers, HcClenon and Tayloe,
1982 ].
First, there must be an adequate product description.
The product should be describable in a rigorous fashion, so
that potential suppliers can understand and comply with the
Government's requirements. Second, there needs to be a good
TDP. Even with the most tried and tested specifications,
new sources will have some technical difficulties as a re-
sult of different production engineering approaches. It may
very well happen that new sources who quote "tight" prices
in competition will, subsequent to award, go ever the speci-
fications with a sharp, bright light scrubbing the package
intensively in order to support deficiency claims.
It is generally considered advisable to wait unitl the
item is in production to develop the TDP in order to ensure
that the package is adequate and most production problems
have been identified and resolved. 3ut a counter point
raised by several analysts is that competition should begin
as early as possible to maximize the potential savings, and
the chance of having a competitive second source as early as
possible [ Bemis and Pargher, undated].
Proprietary rights to certain elements of the TDP may not
be the only reason for scle-source procurement, but a con-
tractor's priprietary data position does sometimes force the
buyer into a sole source position [McKie, 1966]. Direct and
indirect costs of technology transfer may be prohibitively
high if the Government does not own the rights.
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Large enough guantitiee must exist to make second sourc-
ing worthwhile for both Government and suppliers. Many
items, especially advanced weapon systems, reguire large
initial start-up costs. To justify this front-end invest-
ment, large guantities are necessary to realize savings
through reductions in recurring unit costs.
In the case of advanced, sophisticated systems, it is
mandatory that the Government have gualified technical per-
sonnel to evaluate the TDP, assist the second source, and
coordinate technical changes initiated by either supplier.
The Government should have available at least two inde-
pendent suppliers with technical competence and requisite
facilities who are able and willing to compete. Problems
experienced by the current contractor may be of sufficient
magnitude to discourage any interest in competing. Seme
contractors may have adequate knowledqe to compete, but may
not be willing, due to availability of more lucrative alter-
natives. Second sourcing will not work if serious new
sources cannot be established and the original source is
keenly aware of his competitors. Sufficient lead time must
be available tc meet production schedule and deployment re-
quirements. The tasks which fill this lead time include;
(a) source selection, (b) first article qualification, (c)
pre-award survey, and (d) learning buy awards.
2. 6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In this chapter we have reviewed virtually all of the rela-
tively recent studies undertaken to guantify the extent to
which savings are available from the competition of formerly
noncompetitive procurement awards. The results of prior
studies, however, are far from conclusive. Furthermore, in
a majority of cases, faulty methodology or data deficiencies
have diminished their usefulness. In this section, we will
briefly discuss the generally recognized data and methodolo-
gical deficiencies of prior empirical works [ for mor detail
see Arvis, 1980; Archibald, et al., 1981].
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Data deficiencies result from; (1) the need to use sub-
jective input when objective data are lot available, and (2)
the need to adjust, often somewhat arbitrarily, the data for
consistency. Since contract data are not designed for tha
purpose of statistical analysis, a certain degree of data
adjustment is inevitable. However, the degree of adjustment
has been so extensive in some studies that the usefulness cf
their results must be guestioned.
The first methodological deficiency, found in most early
empirical studies and some relatively recent ones, is the
failure to consider the effects of learning and inflation in
computing the savings from introducing competition. The
difference between the last sole source price and the first
competitive price was considered the savings attributable to
competition. These studies typically reported a very large
amount of savings from introducing competition.
The second methodological deficiency may be characterized
by the omission of the front-end investment costs. Some
studies admitted that the second-source start-up cost should
be considered by decision makers, but omitted it in the sta-
tistical analysis. Other studies, however, exhort the vir-
tue of price competition with "e vidences" of procurement
savings without even mentioning that there were front-end
investment reguirements. Although this problem might be at-
tributed partially to bias on the part of the researcher,
the attitude cf some program managers may partially be at
blame as well. Results cf interviews with DoD acguisition
managers show that most of the interviewees consider the
second sourcing effort a success if the unit price of the
system is lower than was projected from an extrapolation of
the original producer's price-reduction curve, or if the
original producer lowers its price after competition [Parry,
1979 ]. It is difficult tc determine whether this attitude
was influenced ty biased empirical works or the results of
the studies were induced by this attituie.
It should be noted that those studies which separately
analyzed recurring costs and nonrecurring costs found only
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relatively modest savings, averaging in tae rang? of 7% to
15% in recurring cost reduction for low value radios, mis-
siles and components. [Lcvett and Norton, 1978; Brannon, et
al., 1979].
Although some of the empirical works include the front-
end start-up costs in estimating savings, many left out sig-
nificant elements of start-up costs for various reasons.
The most freguent omissions are the cost of the TDP, the
cost of the original contractor's assistance to the new
source, and the cost of additional administrative effort.
Another common deficiency is the failure to discount sav-
ings. As we mentioned earlier, front-end investments are
short-term while potential savings may not be realized for
several years. Sound investment policy, as well as OMB di-
rection, calls for discounting savings.
Although the effect of production rata changes on unit
production cost is well Icncwn, this factor was not consid-
ered in empirical studies until guite recently. Nona of tha
comprehensive studies conducted by IDA, APRO, or the Army
Electronic Command includes this factor.
Another factor that has never been addressed in prior
studies is the degree of subcontracting and its impact on
the chance of savings if competition is introduced. Con-
tractors argue that, for most major systems, the prime gets
only about 20% of the contract dollar, and only half of that
is labor [Richardson, 1982]. Although we do not necessarily
agree with this particular argument, wa do believe that the
extent to which common subcontractors are used by both
sources should be a factor in the second sourcing decision.
Finally, with the exception of the APRO 78 study, none of
the comprehensive studies was able to identify any relation-
ship wnich would be useful for predictive purposes. Unfor-
tunately, items examined by the APRO 78 study are mainly
simple systems competed on a winner-taice-all or buy-out ba-
sis. The result has little meaning for major systems under
consideration for split-buy competition.
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2.7 ADDITIONAL ISSUES RAISED
Dsspita the multitude of empirical stulies undertaker, during
the past decade, there has been only a modest reduction in
the uncertainty associated with estimating the savings from
introducing coapetition to a previously sol* source procure-
ment. There have been some obvious advances. Methodologi-
cally, the use of constant dollar, the extrapolation of sole
source price-reduction curves, and the inclusion of a pro-
duction rate term are typical among jde; recent studies.
The separation of the one-time "shift" from sustained curve
"rotation," the inclusion cf front-end investment, and dis-
counting of future benefits are also now recognized as nec-
essary.
Given that the magnitude of savings from competition is a
function cf sc many factors, the limited number of case his-
tories of major weapon systems acquisitions has apparently
prevented researchers from isolating patterns of savings
that would significantly reduce uncertainty. Complicating
this problem is the lack cf a theoretical foundation to ex-
plain the findings of empirical works.
In fact, prior works have relied upon a strictly empiri-
cal approach, totally ignoring the insight potential from
the economist's "theory of the firm." The assessment by Ar-
chibald, et al., of the current state of the art seems to be
disturbingly tru^ [1981:52]:
Current understanding of the competitive repro-
curement process is meager. It would, for exam-
ple, be an understatement to say that the determi-
nants of post-competition price differences have
not yet been identified. He are unable to discov-
er a relatively complete list of even the £oten-
tial determinants.
The RAND study offers the following important questions that
should be addressed in studying competition in weapon sys-
tems acquisition:
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1. In what circumstances does competition lead to
cost reductions in production, or profit reduc-
tions, or some combination of the two?
2. Does competition influence a firm's efficiency
by inducing it to invest in oapital equipment,
manufacturing technology, or product develop-
ment? Under what circumstances?
3. How does the firm's general business situation
and alternative investment strategies affect
the impact of competition?
To address the first two guestions, program-specific as well
as ccntractor-specif ic data are needed. The third question
is akin to the issue raised by SAI's r=saarchers, 3eltramo
and Jordan, which is that the impact of introducing competi-
tion depends on the ability and willingness of potential
suppliers to compete [1982],




Clearly, the pries the Government must pay to acquire goods
from a contractor serves two functions. One cf thasa is to
reimburse the contractor for the costs it must incur to sup-
ply the goods. The other is tha generation of profit.
Profit, of course, compensates the contractor's stockholders
for the use of their funds, and for the risks they assume.
Lately, QcD-contractor profitability has been very much
an issue. Some observers express alirm that low profits
threaten to convert the defense business into a "market of
last resort." Others allege defense contractors earn "ex-
cessive" profits. Here we explore the apparent contra-
diction between these viewpoints. Specifically, we examine
data covering 20 years, and study how the profitability of
DoD contracts has been influenced. We ask how profitable
contractors are in their DoD v-rsus commercial business seg-
ments, " and whether the risk levels faced are equivalent.
Our conclusion is that Program Managers (PM's) have been
able to take advantage of the bargaining power they hold to
nuy goods at substantially lower profit margins when capaci-
ty utilization is low. The returns earned by contractors on
DoD business are measurably lower than the returns on com-
mercial business during periods of low capacity utilization.
Also, the volatility of returns is higher for DoD business
which means the risks are viewed by management as being
somewhat higher.
3. 1 CONTRACTOR PROFITS
The importance of profit to the relationship between 'he DoD
and defense contractors is formally recognized in the De-
fense Acquisition Regulations [DAR 3-803. 1 (a) ].
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to
utilize profit to stimulate efficient contract
performance. Profit generally is the basic motive
of business enterprise.
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This profit policy is designed to insare that the bsst and
most efficient industrial capability will continue to be at-
tracted to DoD work. The policy recognizes that the DoD
must actively compete with the commercial market to attract
this capability.
3.1.1 Adequacy of Profit
Lately, though, the sufficiency (or largess) of contractor
profitability has been subject to debate [Profit Study
Group, 1976]. Col. J. R. Woody, for example, has reacted
with alarm to reports of relatively low realized returns and
generally higher risks faced by contractors [Woody, 1982].
He feels there is a chance that this situation might convert
the defense business into a "market of last resort." There
is also concern that if this attitude prevails among finan-
cial institutions, defense contractors may have difficulty
obtaining necessary funds during periods of tight credit
[Brown and Stothoff, 1976].
On the ether hand, it has been widely alleged by organi-
zations such as the General Accounting Office (GAO) -.hat de-
fense contractors earn "excessive" profits [U.S. Congress,
1971]. The striving for competition in weapon systems ac-
quisition is, in large part, attributable to a growing sense
of futility--a feeling that efforts to control acguisition
costs through audits, negotiation and administrative pres-
sure fail to reduce this "excessive" profit.
Much of the apparent contradiction between these view-
points can be attributed to the difficulty researchers have
in measuring the profitability of a portion of a firm's
business. Thcmas, for example, has shown how terribly equi-
vocal the process of allocating corporate overhead to divi-
sions can te [Thomas, 1969].
3.1.1.1 DoD Division "Cost"
The performance of a defense contract is often accounted for
in a separate business unit (or division) of a company.
This obviously means the Project Manager is interested in
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just how the contractor accounts for diract costs, and in
how corporate overhead and other indirect costs ar 9 allocat-
ed to divisions.
The Cost Accounting- Standards Board (CASB) was estab-
lished, largely at the urging of ADM Rickover, to bring uni-
formity and consistency to tha process of determining the
cost of goods produced for the Government. Even though the
CASB no longer exists, its pronouncements live on by fores
of law. However, they have fallen somavhat short of bring-
ing total uniformity and consistency to the accounting pro-
cess. Flexibility still exists in several areas.
One exampla cf continuing flexibility is the allocation
of home office expenses. Even though Standard 403 addressed
the problem, contractors can choose among at least three
bases— payroll, revenue and assets— in determining the
amount of cost the DoD division, and hence its products, is
to absorb. Residuals are allocated by a formula. If the
contractor is so motivated, the method which maximizes
"cost" can be select ed--legally.
Standard 410 deals with th 5 allocation of general and ad-
ministrative expenses to final cost objectives. Allowed
bases include materials, payroll and overhead. Again, the
one which maximizes "cost" can be selected.
The allocation of service center (a department which
serves manufacturing departments but doas not itself work on
products, such as aachine maintenance) costs is the focus of
Standard 4 18. Here use of either the "reciprocal" or "se-
quential" method is allowed and, under certain circumstan-
ces, the "direct" method. Which will tha contractor choose?
Finally, allocation of engineering costs is treated in
Standard 420. The contractor can keep track of the amount
of time spent by engineers on DoD vork, and then allocate
the cost diractly. Otherwise, tha cost can be included in
an overhead pool and treated in any of the ways allowed for
other overhead costs.
In short, we feel Thomas is right. So much flexibility
remains that measuring the profitability of a port ion of a
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firm's business is virtually impossible. The pro
f
inability
of a portion cf a firm's business can be significantly al-
tered by using different cost allocation methods. Even un-
der a cost £lus fix ed fee or firm fixed grica contract, the
fee ascertained by the government contracting officer as
reasonable does not represent the true prof inability of the
government contract.
3. 1 . 2 Profit Varies with Conditions
Some of the rest of the contradiction :an be attributed to
the fact that the different studies have been conducted at
different times, and competitive conditions change through
time. There is good reason to believe the relative profit-
ability of defense business may also vary with conditions.
It is well-understood that whan the economy slackens, and
excess manufacturing capacity grows, (real) prices tend to
drop and profit margins weaken [Shapiro ani Baumoi, 1970].
Wh ~n demand falls, firms (particular!/ those with larger
fixed costs) tend to engage in vigorous price competition
[Ferguson, 1969]. Any positive contribution (surplus of
price over direct costs) a contractor generates can help"
offset fixed costs. The amount of profit reduction experi-




. 3 Do D as a Lar 3a Castoaer
It is undeniable that the DoD is a powerful buyer. The
amount of bargaining power held by program managers (PM's)
is particularly great in heavily defense-oriented industries
such as aerospace, where the Government usually accounts for
between U0% and 60% of total sales. We therefore suggest
the following:
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gains," and buy goods at lower profit margins. Prof- |
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measurably lower than profits on commercial business 1
during periods of low capacity utilization. However,
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have no incentive to accept DoD orders. 1
It is this hypothesis we seek to test.
3-2 EHPIHICAL EXAMINATION
In the pages that follow, we will report on the steps taken
to test the hypothesis that the state of capacity utiliza-
tion in the aerospace industry is a determinant of the rela-
tive profitability of DoD business to commercial business.
8e concentrated on firms in the aerospace industry because
aerospace firms account for the largest dollar value propor-
tion of defense acquisitions. Included were certain firms
known to be significant aerospace suppliers, but categorized
D7 lilS Value Line Investment Su r ye y as "multiform," "elec-
trical" or "electronics." A- representative, although not
exhaustive, list of the firms included in the study is shewn
in Table 3.1.
We will begin with a description of t ne data examined.
Next the topic will turn to the analytical methods used.
Finally, we will discuss the results and some of the more
important implications.
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TABLE 3. 1






Hughes Aircraft General Dynamics
General Electric Ford Aerospace
North American Rockwell Texas Instrument
3. 2. 1 Descript ion of Data
The data examined in this study lie in two categories; cor-
porate data and capacity utilization data. The relevant
corporate data, including financial performance indicators
and, for reasons soon to be made clear, the volume cf DoD
business, were extracted from Value Line. (Actually, Value
LiH£ indicates the percentage of each company's revenues
which derive from "Government business." We used this as a
surrogate for "DoD business.") Two profitability measures
were catalogued--prof it as a percentage of sales and profit
as a percentage of net worth.
Capacility utilization information wis obtained from the
Federal Reserve Board. Unfortunately, capacity utilization
figures for individual firms are not available. These data
are therefore for the aerospace industry as a whole.
The time span covered by this analysis is the last twenty
years; so all relevant data were collected for 1963 through
1982. The percentage of Government business was not report-
ed for every firm, every year. Also, there was significant
entry and exit of new and old firms during the twenty years.
Neither of these factors constituted a problem, however,
since each year's data set was certainly representative of
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the industry, and included appr oximats ly 25 firms— a suffi-
cient number to provide statistical confidence in the re-
sults.
3.2.2 Preliminary Analysis
As mentioned earlier, profitability of a &2£tk2H - a compa-
ny's business is subject tc changes when allocation methods
differ. Unless all firms use the sama allocation aethods,
profits of specific segments will not be comparable. In-
deed, no source of financial information routinely reports
the aerospac-5 industry's net rates of return on the specific
segments of inter est--DoD versus commercial. Only the
amount of profit earned by the firm as a whole is available
for analysis. It was therefore necessary for us to use rs-
gression analysis as a dis-aqgr
e
gation technique. We will
describe the procedure used and display the results.
3.2.2.1 Dis-Aggregation Regressions
For each of the twenty years, the indiviiual firms' percent-
ages of Government business were used as an independent
variable, and the two profitability measures catalogued ear-
lier were treated as dependent variables. Thus, 20 regres-
sions of the form I = a * bx were produced, tracking return
on sal=s as a function cf percent of Government business
through time. Another 20 regressions of the same form
tracked return on net worth as a function of the same inde-
pendent variable. All twenty values of "a" and "b" for both
forms are shown in Table 3.2.
The sharp break in the values contained in the "a" column
under "Profit on Sales" between 1968 and 1969 is due to a
change in the way this percentage was calculated by Value
Line. This break will turn out to b= of no consequence in
the analysis. Our interest will focus on ratios taken from
the individual regressions. Only the ratios will be com-
pared through time.
Each regression was next evaluated at OS Government busi-
ness and at 100% GDvernment business. rha ratio of the lat-




Profit as Fancticn of Gov2rnme:it Business
Profit on Sales Profit on Net Worth
Year a b a b
1963 13.30 -0.094 1 1. 30 0.008
1964 15,00 -0.102 14.90 -0.024
1965 14.50 -0.091 15.50 -0.01
1
1966 12.90 -0.061 15. 10 -0.012
1967 9.85 -0.040 14. 80 -0.016
1968 1 1.90 -0.062 13.00 0.307
1969 4.58 -0.026 13. 50 -0.022
1970 4.92 -0.042 14.50 -0.066
1971 3.16 -0.021 7.36 0.002
1972 4.66 -0.042 12. 90 -0.094
1973 6.85 -0.074 14.00 -0.068
1974 4.86 -0.033 13.60 -0.018
1975 4.1 1 -0.023 1 1.80 -0.01 1
1976 5.27 -0.045 14. 10 -0.007
1977 4.94 -0.017 13. 10 0.069
1978 5.21 -0.008 14. 60 0.052
1979 6.15 -0.014 19. 10 -0.032
1980 6.64 -0.035 21.40 -0. 133
1981 6.72 -0.041 20. 50 -0.135
1982
i
5.48 -0.024 11.60 0.010
tar to the former yields the relative profitability of Gov-
ernment (DcD) business to commercial business, as indicated
by the chosen return measure. Using profit on salss, for
example, at 0% Government business the return is 13.3%, For
100% Government business we find the return is 13.3% - 9.4*.
= 3.9%, so the ratio is 3.9 to 13.3, or .29 to 1 , or 29%.
The generally lower profit for government business also can
be seen from the negative values of M b" in Table 3.2.
3.2.2.2 Smoothing
To help reduce the volatility introduced by the accounting
principle of periodicity, and to widen the time perspective
associated with capacity utilization, we used a resistant
time series smoother followed by a simple Banning running
average [Velleman, 1980]. Thus, the profitability ratios as
calculated on both the sales and net worth bases, as well as
the measure cf capacity utilization, were smoothed. The
smoothed data are listed in Table 3,3 below.
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TABLE 3.3
Smoothed Profit ability Data Set
Smoothed Ratio cif P rof itability
of DoD to Commercial Smoothed
Business as a Percentage on Capacity
Year Sales N-it Worth Utilization
(R:S) (H:MW) (CO)
1963 2 9.7 99.2 83.
1964 34. 4 94.8 33.7
1 965 41.8 92.4 86.0
1 966 4 8. 5 91.7 88.3
1967 50.8 91.3 89. 1
1968 4 8.9 89.5 87.0
1969 41.6 85.2 80.0
1970 3 0. 2 75.5 72.2
1971 21.6 64.7 69. 3
1972 18.8 60.6 69.7
1973 19. 1 63.5 70.7
1974 2 3.2 74. 1 71.3
1975 35.5 92.4 71.7
1 976 53.7 1 09. 1 72.2
1977 67.4 1 15.0 74.3
1978 71. 1 1 06. 1 79.1
1979 67.0 88.2 31. 2
1980 6 0.2 79. 3 30.6
1981 57.0 79.3 78. 1
1982 5 6.9 79.3 73.9
Means
L ... —
4 3.9 86.6 78. 1
A summary review of the data set contained in Table 3.3
might be helpful. The profitability figures show how the
industry's return on the respective bases compared for DoD
versus commercial business each twenty years, as measured
with the smoother. For example, in 1982 the smoothed profit
rate as measured on sales (labeled "R : S" for "Ratio: Sales")
was 56.9% as high for DoD business as it was for commercial
business. During the same year, the smoothed return on net
worth for DoD business was 79.3% of the same figure for com-
mercial business (R:NW). Note that the smoothed capacity
utilization figure (CU) reached a low of 69.35 in 1971 after
a high of 89. 1* in 1967. In 1982 the smoothed utilization
rate was down to 73.9%. The profitability ratios reached
their high points in 1977 (on net worth) and 1978 (on
sales). The "lows" both occurred in 1972. Figure 3.1 shows
these data graphically through time. During only one peri-
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od, 1976-78, has the return on net worth bean higher fcr DoD
business than for commercial. The return ratio on a salss
basis has never begun to even approach 133 X. The mean value
of R:S is 43.9%, while the average of the R:NH values is
86.655. Capacity utilization has averaged 78.15.
3 <»
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Figure 3.1: Profit Ratios and Utilization vs Tira<
i
Next we turn to the task of seeing whather there is a
statistically significant relationship between CU and R:S
and/or R:NW. Again, the appropriate methodology was felt to
be regression.
3. 2. 3 Associat ive Analy sis
To test for association between the two dependent variables
and the independent variable, CU , we ran regressions of two
forms:
(1) R:S = f (CU) ,
and, (2) R:NW = g (CU) .
The results were:
( 1) R:S = -34.5 + 1.00 CU,
and, (2) R:NW = 12.8 + 3.94 CU.
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To interpret and illustrate the use of these regressions, at
a capacity utilization rate of, say, 855, Form 1 would tell
us to expect a profitability ratio base! on sales of about,
-34.5 + 1.00 (85*) = 50. 5%.
Form 2 would have us expect a profitability ratio based on
net worth cf,
12.8 + 0.94 (8515) = 92 .1%.
These were roughly the conditions of the aid to late six-
ties. But if CO were to drop to, say, 70%, we would antici-
pate
R:S = -34.5 1.00 (10%) = 35.5%,
and, R:SH = 12.8 + 0.94 (70%) = 78.5%.
This is more like the 1973-75 period. The reader might like
to note that the smoothed capacity utilization rate in 1982
was 13.9%. The regressions predict R:S = 39.4% and R:NH =
82.3%. The actual values were R:S = 56. 93--higher than an-
ticipated, and 79.35--a bit lower than expected. Note that
the positive coefficients indicate that contractors' demand
for higher profit from government contracts increases as the
industry's capacity utilization improves.
Beth forms of the regression easily pass one-tailed sta-
tistical significance tests at the .35 confidence level.
The T-ratio values were 1.83 for Form 1 and 1.97 for Form 2.
The critical value of "T" is 1.73 with 18 degrees of free-
dom.
3.2.3.1 Interpretation
These regressions constitute strong statistical support for
the original hypothesis that PM ' s are able to use their bar-
gaining power to advantage during industry lulls in capacity
utilization, but that they must reach parity with commercial
business during busy periods. However, the last portion of
that statement must be qualified. The DoD never reaches
profit parity as measured by return on sales, so the proper-
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tion of the DcD procurement dollar thi t goes to contractor
profits is never as high as is the case for commercial buy-
ers. The approximate smoothed capacity utilization point at
which profit parity could normally ba expected on a net
worth basis would be 92.81?; but at no time during the last
20 years have we reached that point. This implies the
1976-78 period was abnormal.
Now we turn to an analysis of the risks faced by aero-
space contractors doing business with the DoD versus commer-
cial customers. Here the results will be less cl^ar.
3. 2. 4 Hisjc Ana lys is
"Risk" can be defined and measured in several ways. One
view is from inside the firm-- through the eyes of manage-
ment. This perspective of risk concerns itself with the
volatility cf earnings.
3.2.4.1 Volatility of Earnings
Earnings measures based on sales are generally less impor-
tant to management than returns or. net worth, so we will
adopt the latter as our metric for risk measurement from the
viewpoint of the firm.
Management must budget cash flows ani exhibit appealing
pictures of net income growth. These tasks are made easier
if earnings are stable and predictable than if returns are
volatile. All things equal, management would prefer stable
returns. Said another way, if the earnings rates on a par-
ticular line of business are more volatile, management will
seek a higher avera ge rate of return as compensation.
We have established above that avenge returns (as meas-
ured on net worth) have been generally lower on DoD business
during the last 20 years than the returns on commercial
business have been. At this stage, however, we need to com-
pare volatility.
aeturning to the preliminary analysis, we arrayed the
dis-aggregated returns on net worth for 03 Government busi-
ness in one group and for 100% Government business in an-
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other. Next, we calculated the standard deviations of tha
two groups, as indications of their volatility. The stan-
dard deviation of returns on Do D work was 4.2:3; tha same
number for commercial business was 3.2X. Not only are re-
turns lower for DoD business, but. the risks as viewed by
management are somawhat higher. This observation explains
the necessity of reaching (or exceeding) parity with commer-
cial profitability whan capacity is pushad. All things
equal, management's preference from a risk/return viewpoint
would be for commercial work.
3. 2. U. 2 Stock Price Volatility
Another measurement perspective for ris/c is to virw volatil-
ity of returns through the eyas of the financial markets:
in this case, the markat for equity securities. Two meas-
ures are relevant— total risk and "systematic" risk.
Total risk is simply the volatility of returns to the
equities market. Val ue Line measures this with a "Price
Stability Index" (PSI) , en a scale of zero to 100. The
higher the number, the mere stable the firm's s-.ock price
and, therefore, total returns to tha market.
The analysis method used here was to take the most recent
PSI and "percent Government business" figures for the firms
in the industry, and to again run a regression. The coeffi-
cient ("b") was -0.38, with a T-ratio of -2.68. This im-
plies, for example, that if a firm's percentage of DoD busi-
ness were to rise by 10%, its PSI would decline by about 3.8
points. Total risk, as seen through tha financial mar ket j_s
eyes, is also higher.
Total risk is a relevant factor to small investors who
may hold the securities of only a few firms, but institu-
tional investors and mutual funds are aisle to hold shares of
a sufficiently large number of companies so as to diversify
away part of the risk. The portion of total risk which can-
not be diversified away is termed "systematic risk" and can
be measured by a stock's "beta." This measure (also report-
ad by Val ue Line ) indicates the extent to which the returns
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from holding a particular firm's stock are correlated to the
re-urns frcm holding all ether securitias.
Again, we ran a regression; this Lima to s ee whether
"beta" can be associated with the percentage of DcD busi-
nass. But hare the coafficient was trivially small and sta-
tistically insignificant indicating no association.
3.2.4.3 Interpretation
The signals deriving from the risk analysis sacticn are
slightly mixed, but int erpreta ble . It is a firm's beta
which requires higher financial returns in the securities
markets. He did find tha betas for aarospace firms to be
higher than the market average, indicating aarospace is a
riskier industry, but the macjn_i.tii.de of beta was independent
of the percentage of DoD work undertakan. This means that
the amount of DoD business dona by a fin should not have an
impact on its ability to raise equity capital. This inter-
pretation may be substantiated by the fact that tha Govern-
ment typically financas a portion of tha funds needed by a
major weapon systems contractor through government furnished
equipment, progress payments, etc.
However, tota l risk was positively associated with the
parcentage of DoD business, meaning the ownership of high
DoD-percantage firms' securities is likely to be concentrat-
ed in the hands of institutional investors. This may be a
social issue.
3. 3 COBCLOSICNS AND IMPLICATIONS
Several conclusions which have implications for acquisition
management can be drawn. The real objective of this Chapter
has teen to examine carefully the available data so as to
provide answers to the following questions:
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1. Is the profitability of DoD contracts influ-
enced by the state of capacity utilization in
the industry?
2. How profitable are the major isrospace contrac-
tors in their DcD versus commercial business
segments?
3. Given risk levels faced by contractors, is the
return aarned on DoD business squivalent tc
L
that of commercial work?
The answer to the first question is "yes." Program Banagers
(PM's) are able to take advantage of ths large amount of
bargaining power they hold to drive "hard bargains"-- to buy
goods at substantially lower profit margi.ns--when capacity
utilization is lew, but must pay higher prices when capacity
is "pushed." This causes profits to risa when the industry
is busy, and to fall during slack periods.
The profits earned by contractors on DoD business are
measurably lower than profits earned on commercial busi-
ness
—
particularly during periods of low capacity utiliza-
tion. Figure 3.1 reveals 1976 through 1978 to hava been the
only time period covered by this study during which DoD-re-
lated returns have exceeded these on commercial business.
Even though DoD-related profits increase relative to commer-
cial-work profits as capacity utilization rises, we would
not normally expect the two profit ratas to be egual to one
another until the 92. Q% point is reachad (on a smoothed ba-
sis) . At no time during the last 20 yaars has this occur-
red.
The lower returns found for DoD business might be accep-
table if the attendant risks were lower. However, ^one of
the three risk measures used shows DoD work to be less risky
than commercial. In fact, management is apt to prefer com-
mercial work because the volatility of returns on net worth
is lower. Total market risk, as measured by the PSI, is
also lower for firms with higher proportions of commercial
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business. Beta is comparable for differant weightings of
the two segments, though, which implies higher average re-
turns are not necessary to attract equity capital.
In short, there appears to be reason for concern but not
for alarm. Capital generation should not be an especially
difficult problem for the aerospace industry, but the dis-
tribution of the shares of stock of those firms who tend to
specialize in DcD work will be more concentrated in the
hands of larger investors.
The more difficult task will be to find some way to im-
prove management's outlook on the risk/return relationship
for DoD business. This might be done in either of two ways.
One would be to reduce Government's voracity for "hard bar-
gains" when industry is slow. The other is to be willing to
allow higher profit levels when capacity utilization is
high. Either way, we must recognize the undeniable fact
that the industry's capacity utilization situation is a ma-
jor determinant of the price the Government must pay for ma-
jor weapon systems.





In the field cf major weapon systems acquisition, cost esti-
mation, always a difficult problem, is mad? even more ardu-
ous when the procurement is conducted under dual-source com-
petition. "Rule of thumb" quantifications of the savings
resulting from competition have been disappointingly unreli-
able. It is probably even fair to say that we do not yet
fully understand exactly how and when competition produces
savings. The research which has been done on the known his-
tories suggests that dual sourcing of major weapon systems
has resulted in added life cycle costs as often as it has
produced savings [Beltramo and Jordan, 1982]. Surely this
has not been intentional.
Most recent attempts to sharpen our cost estimation abil-
ities have focused on adding a production rate term to the
conventional learning curve model [Smith, 1980]. However,
the magnitude (and even the direction) of the effect on to-
tal program cost of altering production rates is not always
foreseeable--particularly under dual sourcing. So its in-
clusion in the modal, while often helpful, sometimes lsaus
the analyst astray.
In this Chapter we explore a possibility that the effect
of competition on the cost of acquiring major weapon systems
under dual sourcing can more reliably be estimated by sub-
stituting an industry capacity utilization concept for the
production rate concept. Simply said, the hypothesis is
that
:
competition produces greater savings wnen firms are |
"hungry;" when the industry is very active, dual
sourcing is of little benefit as a cost reducer. I
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4. 1 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Two basic economic concepts should be rsviawed pricr to mov-
ing into the details of the analysis. The first is that
typical manufacturing organizations have average unit cost
functions that are U-shaped with respect to production vol-
ume. The other is that competing firms, particularly in the
durable equipment industries, tend to bid (real) selling
prices down during economic slumps. He will briefly examine
each of these concepts.
4.1.1 Average Dni t Cost
The generality of U-shaped unit cost functions is well
grounded in economic theory [Bierman and Dyckman, 1976;
Brennan, 1960]. As an illustration, consider Figure 4.1.
Here the firm's average unit cost is assumed to be minimized
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Figure 4.1: U-Shaped Average Unit Cost
The downward slope of the cost curve at lower activity
levels is caused by spreading fixed costs over an increasing
number of units as output rises. Eventually, however, a
point is reached where diseconomies of scale begin to set
in. Third-shift premiums or overtime might be required. Or
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perhaps less efficient "spars" machinery is brought into
use. Idle time might increase as mors maintenance nus 1; be
done while production is iu progress. It might be necessary
for the firm to increase its reliance en subcontractors. If
the subcontractors' capacities are also "pushed," this could
further aggravate the problem.
Production rate researchers have usually shown an aware-
ness of the U-shaped curve [Bemis and Fargher, undated; Cox
and Gar.sler, 198 1]. Unfortunately, these same researchers
have used single-parameter, ever-decreasing versions of the
rate term in their empirical analyses. However, some of
these works have shown positive production rate exponents,
implying the data indeed came from a setting such that the
firms' rates of activity placed them beyond the degre<= of
capacity utilization associated with lewest average unit
cost [Kratz, et al. , undated; Smith, 1975].
In fact, the effect en unit cost of changing a firm's
production rate depends on its physical facilities, its la-
bor/capital relationship, and on the amount of other busi-
ness the contractor has at the time of the change. Even the
shaj)e of the rate/cost curve, in addition to the slope, dif-
fers from case to case. Therefore no universal parameter
value for the production rate impact exists.
4.1.2 Co§£e t it ion a nd E xces s Ca pacity
When the economy slackens, and excess manufacturing capacity
grows, (real) prices tend to drop and profit margins weaken
[Shapiro and Baumcl, 1970]. This means that if a se llin g
p_rice curve were superimposed on the cost curve illustrated
in Figure 4.1, its minimum point would tend to lie to the
left of 70??.
If demand fails even further, firms (particularly those
with larger fixed costs) tend to engage in vigorous price
competition [Ferguson, 1969]. Any positive contribution
(selling price less direct cost) can help offset fixed
costs. The result of this intense competition is that the
minimum point cf the selling price curve (which is the cost
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curve for th?> buyer) lies even further to the left, and is
probably below the cost curve, meaning the firm would be op-
erating at a loss.
We should ncte that without c omp etition there would b= no
incentive for the firm to lower its selling price. There-
fore the ability of a buyer to take advantage of excess ca-
pacity to reduce cost is dependent on the existence of com-
petition. Said another way, the amount of savings which can
be attributed to competition should be inversely related to
the state of capacity utilization in the industry.
In the preceeding chapter, we have saown that the size of
profit from Government contracts incrsises with an increase
of industry capacity utilization. In this chapter, we will
test to see whether capacity utilization has an impact on
the final purchase price paid by DoD.
4.2 AN EHPIHICAL EX AM I NATION
In the pages that follow, we report the steps we took to
test the hypothesis that the state of capacity utilization
in the relevant industry is useful in? ut information for an
analyst who is attempting to estimate the cost of weapons to
be acguired under dual source competition. We will begin
with a description of the data examined. A simple plausi-
bility check of the hypothesis will follow. Next, the con-
struction of the rate and capacity utilization models which
were compared will be described. Finally, we will show the
results obtained with the two models.
4. 2. 1 De scription of Data
The data examined in this portion of the study lie in two
categories
—
program data and capacity utilization data. We
will briefly describe each.
The program data describe the acquisition histories of
seven weapons which were dual sourced (after a brief period
of sole-source procurement). These data were supplied by
Science Applications, Inc. (SAI) . They are listed in Appen-
dix A. It should be emphasized that this group constitutes
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the entire census of major weapon systems for which verifia-
ble price data are readily available.
The prices were converted to fiscal ysar 1972 dollars by
applying the DoD inflation index. Prices were considered
mora relevant than contractor cost because of the procure-
ment perspective, and because prices capture the effects of
varying amounts of profit from Government business under
different market environments. Prices also reflect the ef-
fects of "gaming," which is so prevalent in dual sourcing.
Unfortunately, capacity utilization figures for individu-
al firms are net available. The capacity utilization data
are therefor? for the aerospace industry. These data were
also used in the preceeding analysis of profit.
4. 2. 2 A Preliainary Check
As a simple plausibility check of the hypothesis, the data
reported in Table 4.1 were assembled. The program savings
(loss) data were taken ftca SAI's report [Beltramo and Jor-
dan, 1982]. The capacity utilizations were averages of the
annual figures for the aerospace industry for the years dur-
ing which dual-source procurement was in effect for each
program.
A Prel.
TABLE 4 . 1
Lminary Hypothesis Check
Percent Savings
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By examining Table 4. 1 , the reader can confirm that SAI
determined that only three of the seven programs generated
sufficient savings from competition to more than offset the
investments reguired to obtain them. (In calculating these
savings, Beltramo and Jordan followed the recommended proce-
dure cf applying a 10% discount rate to the estimated cost
savings, and deducting the cost to the buyer of establishing
competition.) In each of the three "savings" cases, indus-
try capacity utilization averaged less than 80% during the
dual source phase of the procurement. Each time a loss re-
sulted from competition, capacity utilization was running
above 80%.
Our interpretation of this preliminary check is that it
tends to support the general hypothesis. Greater savings do
appear to have resulted frcm competition when capacity uti-
lization was relatively low. Indeed, implementation of dual
sourcing when capacity utilization was higher than about 80%
seems to have been, in retrospect, unwise.
Encouraged by these results, we decided to go ahead with
the actual modeling of a cost estimation procedure which
would allow the analyst to take full advantage cf capacity
utilization forecasts. We felt the rssult of this attempt
should be compare! for performance with the best learning
curve/production rate model we could construct using the
same data and procedures.
4. 2. 3 The Bode Is— General For a
The two models compared in this analysis have th? following
general forms:
Production rate model; 1
a b
P = kQ H j
Capacity utilization model;
a c dM fN
P = kQ e e
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The production rata model is con ventioi al in form. The WQ"
term represents the " raid -point" quantity associated with the
particular buy. Lot size is used as a surrogate for produc-
tion rate, as is the case in virtually all other studies
dealing with rates. Given the lack of detailed production
rata data, the use of lot size seems to be reasonable. "P,"
of course, is the average price for the buy, while "k," "a"
and "b" are parameters.
The capacity utilization model eliminates production rate
as an input and substitutes in its place "U," the smoothed
utilization percentage for the industry. We used a resis-
tant time series smoother followed by i simple Hanning run-
ning average to widen the time perspective associated with
capacity utilization [see Velleraan, 1980]. The term carries
c" as its parameter. In theory, utilization rates can
range from 0'* up to 100%, or perhaps even higher for brief
periods of time. The actual smoothed data set included
measures ranging from a low of 69.23 in 1960 to a high of
89.2% in 1967. For unsmccthed, individual years, the range
for the annual data was 63.5% (1971) to 91.9% (1966).
Since the amount of savings presumedly depends en the
form of competition in effect, two dummy mode variables were
added (see "Capacity utilization model" above);
M=1 if the buy was under dual sourcing, otherwise;
N = 1 if competition was winner-take-all, otherwise.
The parameter for M is "d:" for N, "f." Raising the con-
stant, e, to the resulting powers causes a parallel shift in
the log form of the learning curve.
4.2-4 Deriving Parameters
To place parameters on the models, we first used regression
to fit a log form of the two Candida; e models to the data
described in each of the seven acquisition histories listed
in Table 4.1 and shown in Appendix A. Since these weapons
were procured under dual scurcing, we lerived separate mod-
els for each of the two suppliers.
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4. 2. U.I The Bate Model
Taking the rate model first, we ran both simple regressions
using each independent variable separately, and multiple re-
gressions--so that the best forecasting tool each form of
the model was capable of producing couli be built. In most
cases the rate term was not statistically associated with
the price charged by the original source. However, the rate
term usually was significant for the sezond source.
The next step was to determine parameters for the rate
form of the general forecasting models, using the values de-
rived for the individual programs. This was accomplished
two ways: first by determining the median values of the pa-
rameters in guestion, and then by calculating the mean val-
ues with anomalous observations removed. The resulting





-0. 313 -0. 133
P = kQ R
-0. 316 -0.133
P = kQ S
i




P = kQ R
-0. 32U +0.287
P = kQ R
The learning rates implied by the values of "a" are all
close to 80%, and the value of "b" found for the original
source is amazingly close to the -0.19 value derived by Bern-
is and Fargher in their earlier stuiy of aircraft data
[undated]. The positive exponents for the rate term in the
second-source models may seem odd; but a possible explana-
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tion lies in the fact that if the si:Dnd-soarci wins the
take-out bid it, in effect, becomes a sole source after the
dual-source ccmptetion is over. This event is accompanied
by increases in bath production rates and sailing prices.
It has also been suggested that the second source may be fa-
cilitized at a lower level than the original firm. It would
therefore be more efficient at lower production rates, but
becomes less so as rates rise [O.S. Army, 1980; Carrick,
1982 ].
4.2.4.2 The Capacity Utilization Hodel
A similar procedure was used in deriving parameters for the
capacity utilization modal. However, w= first included all
identifiable independent variables, including rate. The
rate term was found to be statistically significant only
once. The remaining terms therefore specified the surviving
form of the model.
Only significant parameter values from the individual
programs were retained. In the case of the second-source
version, this meant dropping all but the "Q M and "N" vari-
ables. The models were constructed in both the median- and
mean-value forms. For the original source, we found:
With median values;
-0.278 +1.250 -0.201M -0.854N
P = kQ e e
With mean values;
-0.260 +1.765 -0.201M -0.854M
P = kQ e e
i




P = kQ e
With mean values;
-0.214 -.520N
P = kQ 9
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Again, the parameter values seem to make intuitive sense.
The positive exponents for the capacity utilization term fit
the hypothesis, and the negative coefficients for the compe-
tition mode terms imply there is a downward price shift when
competition is implemented. This will be discussed in
greater detail later--and will be qualified in the case of
winner-take-all buy-outs.
It may at first seem odd that the exponent cf "Q" is
"flatter" (and more variable) for the second source than for
the original. However, recall from the analysis in Chapter
2 that it is in exactly this kind of situation that pricing
strategy, or gaming, plays its most prolific role. And, as
discussed in Chapter 3 in a division allocation context, the
Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASB) gave contractors am-
ple opportunity to make adjustments of the "cost" of prod-
ucts. This flexibility extends to temporal adjustments.
Standard 409, for example, addresses depreciation meth-
ods. The contractor is allowed to elect among any of the
methods normally available for financial reporting. These
include (but are not limited to) straight line, declining
balance, sum-of- years '-digits and depreciation by use. Such
elections cause the relative costs of "earlier" versus "lat-
er" units to appear higher or lower so as to "cost justify"
different pricing strategies.
The acquisition cost of materials is treated in Standard
411. The contractor can decide among LIFO, FIFO, average
cost or specific identification. Each of these produces
temporal differences in the cost of product during periods
of changing materials costs.
Standards 414 and 417 affect the cost of depreciable fa-
cilities and materials, therefore increase the magnitude of
the felxibility enjoyed under 4 09 and 411. But there are
freedoms within 414 and 417 which further exacerbate the
problem.
None of this is intended as a condemnation of accounting
principles, or of the results of the CASB effort. We hope
only to make the reader aware of the relative ease with
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which a contractor can "adjust" the cost of products to suit
the situation, both absolutely and temporally.
4. 2. 5 Testing the Models
Due to the limited number of major weipon system histories
for programs which have been dual source!, the only availa-
ble data for testing the two models* performance are the
ones used for the derivations. This is not the best of re-
search procedures, but at least it will produce an indica-
tion of the ability of the methodically derived general
forecasting models to accommodate accurately the individual-
ities of the programs.
The basic plan ot the test is to use each model to fore-
cast at the ojiset of p rocuremen t what the total procurement
cost "will be" for each of the seven programs, then to com-
pare the actual cost to the forecast. We examine only pro-
curement ccst because that is the functional purpose of both
of the models under consideration. Our criteria for compar-
ison will include means and standard deviations of both the
arithmetic and absolute errors as measured by percentage
cost underrun cr overrun from forecast :ost.
It was necessary to make some assumptions about just how
the models would be used to make forecasts. To place each
on an equal footing, it was assumed that the price, quanti-
ty, production rate and smoothed capacity utilization were
all known for the first lot. This enabled "k" to be evalu-
ated, as it was the last remaining term. It was further as-
sumed that the values of the independent variables could be
forecast with accuracy. This last assumption insured that
we were testing the mod els, and not the forecasting accuracy
of the inputs.
The actual implementation was not difficult. First, the
lot "mid-points" ware calculated. The conventional formula,
{ (Q+ 1)/3) +0. 5 , was used tc determine the lot "mid-point" for
the first lot. Lot sizes were used as surrogates for pro-
duction rates as in the derivations. Smoothed capacity uti-
lization measures were used. The dual-source mode term was
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dropped (" B" set to zero) when capacity utilization was
greater than 8016.
The use of the winner-take-all term requires special
elaboration. We noticed from the histories, as have other
researchers, that a winner-take- all, take-out bid situation
seems to produce an unusually low pries only, once. The
price rises again after the first winner-take-all buy, as
the winner, in effect, becomes a sole source. This charac-
teristic is particularly evident in tha TOW and Sidewinder
AIB-9D/G histories. We therefore exercised the winner-take-
all term in the estimating model only, for the fir st buy un-
der this form cf competition. After that point it was ig-
nored. ("N" was reset to zero; i.e., the winner became a
sole-source supplier.) Now consider the summary of results
in Table 4.2. Clearly, the capacity utilization model has
outperformed the rate model in every test.
TABLE 4.2


















The average arithmetic and absolute errors ire lower for ei-
ther version of the capacity utilization model than for ei-
ther version of the rate model. In addition, the lower
standard deviations (shown in parentheses) indicate the pro-
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gr am -to- program variations of actual from foracas* cost are
lower under the capacity utilization moiel.
We view this outcome as strong support for our original
hypothesis. But there are additional insights gained from
the research which bear elaboration.
*• 3 IMPLICATIONS OF FINDIHGS
Several conclusions which have implications for both cost
estimation and acguisition management can b2 irawn from this
study. First, it seems clear that the procurement cost of
major weapon systems could more closely be estimated by us-
ing a capacity utilization concept in placa of the produc-
tion rate concept when the gro cur ame nt is conducted under
competition. There is nc reason to believe prices react to
"hungriness" when an acguisition program is conducted with-
out competition.
Some of the details of the analysis enable us to draw
conclusions which are relevant to the way acquisition pro-
grams are managed. For example, the capacity utilization
term itself was nearly always statistically significant, and
in the predicted (positive) direction. We interpret this as
meaning there is a price reduction in reaction to a change
in capactiy utilization whenever there is a genuine thr sat
of competition.
Others have also suggested the existence of savings from
the threat of competition [including 3eltramo and Jordan,
1982], but now we can quantify the effect. If we use the
median model parameter value of 1.25 fcr the "U" term, a de-
cline in capacity utilization from, say, 80% to 75% could be
expected to produce a 7.8* price savings from the original
source just as a result of the threat of competition. This
gives some indication of the benefits which can be expected
as a result of steps such as clear Government ownership of
the technical data package.
The remainder of the analysis provided additional support
for the notion that i irple mentation of dual sourcing produces
savings only when capacity utilization is less than about
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80%. The dual-sDurce mode term was significant only for
Bullpup and TOW, but nearly significant for Hockeys. These
ware the three programs identified i.i Tabla 4.1 as having
produced savings as a result of competition. The obvious
conclusion is that dual sourcing should not be implemented
unless utilization is expected to be that low. But the pa-
rameter value tells us to expect an 13.2 7o average savings
from implementation under these low-utilization conditions.
The insights gained by our examination of the winner-
take-all term may also have policy implications. We found
the first price paid in a take-out bid situation to have
been much lower--the parameter suggests a 57.4% savings--as
participants try to "buy the market;" but that the savings
do net extend beyond that first buy. The situation seems to
revert to cne of sole source.
We fael that knowledge of the state of capacity utiliza-
tion in the industry in guestion is an important component
to the correct management of the acquisition of major weapon
systems under competition. However, wa must emphasize that
more research is needed to deepen our ability to use such
concepts. Fcr example, might the basio method be even more
reliable if the capacity utilization measures used were
firm-specific rather than composites for the industry? Are
there ways to "customize" the parameters for a specific pro-
gram to improve the accuracy of the forecasts? How could
winner-take-all competitions more effectively be managed?
Is there a way to split dual-source awards so as to take ad-
vantage of the "hungriest" of competitors? What forecasting
techniques can best ba employed to prediot capacity utiliza-
tion?
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Chapter 5
I IMPLEMENTATION AND CONCLUSIONS
3ased on the analysis contained in Chapter 4, we conclude
that knowledge of the state of capacity utilization in the
aerospace industry is an important component of the correct
management of acquisition programs when competition is in
affect. However, more research is needed to implement these
concepts with any confidence. For example, we found in Ta-
ble 4.1 (reproduced as Table 5. 1 below) that ths economic
savings or loss experienced as a result of dual sourcing can
largely be explained by the state of capacity utilization
during the dual-source phase of procurement. But how is one
to know prior to the moment of procurement just what capaci-
ty utilization will be? It is necessary to forecast.
TABL2 5 . 1
A Preliminary Hypothesis Check
Annual
Percent Savings Average Capacity
Procurement or (Loss) Due Utilization During








In this final chapter we will discuss the possibility of
implementation. Of specific interest will be our ability to
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5. 1 FORECASTING CAPACITY OTILIZATION
What forecasting techniques can best )e employed to predict
capacity utilization? Ey examining the plots of monthly
utilization data (Appendix B contains the data, Appendix C
the plots) , one can discern that the aarospace industry has
experienced significant swings which seem to follow a cycli-
cal pattern. We have shown the peaks and valleys since Jan-
uary, 1952, in Table 5.2.
j TABL £ 5 .2
1









Peak August 1953 92.0%
Valley December 1954 70.3
Peak March 195 7 38.5 44 months
Valley June 19 60 63.7 66 months
Peak August 1966 94.2 113 mon ths
I
i
Valley April 1971 61.7 130 months
1
1
Peak November 1979 92.1 159 months
Clearly, both the peak-to-peak and ths valley-to-valley
interludes have grown throughout the period covered, but the
averages are shown in Table 5.3. These data give testimony
to (a) stable cycle extremes and (b) longer recoveries than
declines.
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 leave an impression that time series
methods might offer foresight. This turns out to be true,
but only to a limited extent.
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5.1.1 Tije Series Methods Applied
The most powerful time series models an af the Box and Jen-
kins family [1976]. They are capable of fitting trend, cy-
cle and seasonal patterns of great variety to sufficiently
large data sets. The particular version we us -id is the
ARIMA, which was adapted for MINITAB by Professor tf. Meeker
of lewa State University [1977].
For those who wish to duplicate our results, the version
we used whenever possible was,
ARIMA (0 1) (0 1 1( K,
where K was the length of the last observable average inter-
lude prior to implementation of the procurement program.
When the size cf the data set would not permit this form, we
used a slightly weaker version,
ARIMA (0 1) (0 1) K.
These models were used to obtain a forecast of capacity uti-
lization for each program. In each case the forecast was
produced at the onset of procur ement , which was th=n in a
sole-source mode. The forecast was for aerospace industry
capacity utilization at the middle of the time period during
wnich dual-source procurement was to take place. Therefore,
the forecasts were for 30 to 84 months ahead. The results,
including the decisions which are indicated by blind use of
the "80% rule," are given in Table 5.4.













Forecas t in q
Per iz ds CU Indicat ed
Ahea d Forecast D«;cis:on
30 84.7% Sole




36 34. 4 Sole
48 77.9 Dual
5. 1. 1.1 Outcoae
Since the actual decisions, of course, were to dual source,
we can compare the effect of using the capacity utilization
concept as implemented through a pre-program time series
forecast by quantifying the impact on the cost of the three





















Seme explanation of the information contained in Tabie
5.5 is reguired. First, the outcome would change only if
the decision regarding dual-sour cing were to change. A de-
cision change resulted only for TOW, Sparrow and the MK-46
programs. In the case of TOW this was unfortunate. The
"correct" decision, dual source, was in fact made, but the
use of the tine-series forecast and the 80% rule would have
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produced a sub-optimal, scle-source decision. The conse-
quence of this mistake would have been to forgo tha 26/5 sav-
ings SAI estimated to have actually resulted from dual-
so urcing this program. Based on procurement costs, this
works out to a FY72S93.7 million opportunity loss. This
loss "resulted" from a failure of relatively simple time-se-
ries methods to forecast the deep industry slump which oc-
curred in 1971— the exact time period during which TOW was
dual sourcsd. However, the outcome would have been benefi-
cial for the Sparrow and MK-46 programs. More than FY72S200
million in losses could have bean avoided.
It should be pointed out that the method made wrong deci-
sions in the cases of the Shillelagh and Sidewinder programs
as well, but these were the actual decisions and therefore
do not constitute an incremental loss.
In summary, we find the time-series concept (as imple-
mented) to be disappointingly unreliable as an implementa-
tion tool even though application of the method would have
saved a net of more than FY72S 100 million on these seven
programs. Three of the seven "decisions" were wrong.
5.1.1.2 Improvements Heeded
9a feel it would be necessary to make improvements in our
ability to forecast aerospace capacity utilization before it
could actually be used as a decision variable. However, the
methods we applied were no more than very tentative and ex-
ploratory. There are many ways of forecasting the movement
of economic indicators [see Nelson, 1973], Surely further
research effort could vastly improve this key step to expe-
riencing the savings which are achievable.
5. 2 OTHER IHPLEflEMTATIOM ISSUES
The forecasting of capacity utilization is but one aspect of
the total implementation process. The parameters of the
model must be quantified as well.
The analysis in Chapter 4 showed that the capacity utili-
zation model "fits" the data for the seven programs better
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than the fit achieved with the production rate modal. This
means an analyst faced with the task of quantifying parame-
ters would be left with less statistical "noise" if that an-
alyst were fitting the capacity utilization model. This, in
turn, means it would be easier to make a highly confident
statement about the slope cf the learning or price-reduction
rate curve through the capacity utilization model than with
the rate modal. The knowledge gained would be useful for
making correct comparisons of the performance of vying con-
tractors.
He should also point out that our model includes terms
which explicitly impound the effects of (a) moving to the
dual-source environment and (b) initiation of a winner-take-
all take-out. The parameteric evaluation process should it-
self be beneficial.
Once the model is built, the parameter values could be
altered to study the effects of, for example, trading off
the benefits of competition against the increased learning
value of buying larger quantities fron a sola source when
future conditions are uncertain. What-if drills of this na-
ture aid in anticipating unusual outcomes and other anoma-
lous events.
Seme with whom we have discussed the results of our work
have pointed out that the model could be improved by using
the capacity utilization measures for particualr firms rath-
er than for the industry. We totally agree, and would like
to explore this improvement, but the data are not available.
In the meantime, we have a model that works, and we must
rely on the judgement of the analyst to alter the conclu-
sions depending en the condition of the individual firms in-
volved in the competition. Along these lines, we must re-
mind the analyst that no modal can ever substitute for
experienced, human judgement. For example, a Box-Jenkins
model could net foresee the 197 1 downturn, but many human-
analysts did. The results of any quantitative model should
serve only as information for an experienced, professional
analyst to use in recommending a decision. For a major
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weapon system which costs hundreds of millions of dollars,
no analyst is going to rely on a single quantitative mcd^l
which employs only a few explanatory variables. A detailed
breakdown method of cost estimation is still the basic foun-
dation of cost estimation for major weapon systems. Our
model, however, may be viewed and used as a "scoping" device
to examine the most likely outcome under given market condi-
tions. This important consideration has to date baen ig-
nored.
Also, none of this is intended to suggest that economic
considerations are paramount. As indicated earlier, ther°
are often ether, very valid reasons foe implementing dual
sourcing: such as mobilization base or the achievement of
social goals. Our assumption is simply that we would like
to know what it costs to achieve these othar objectives.
5.3 EXERCISING BESTBAIHT
In Chapter 3 we addressed the profitaoility of Government
versus commercial business in response to those who have ex-
pressed alarm that low profits threaten to convert the de-
fense business into a "market of last resort." The princi-
pal conclusion cf our research is that Program Managers
should be able to take advantage of their knowledge of ca-
pacity utilization to increase the bargaining power they now
hold. The returns earned by contractors on DoD business are
already measurably lower than the raturns on commercial
business during periods of low capacity utilization. Also,
the volatility of returns is higher for DoD business, which
means the risks are viewed by management as being somewhat
higher.
It is undeniable that the DoD is a powerful buyer. The
amount of bargaining power held by program managers is par-
ticularly great in heavily defense-oriented industries such
as aerospace, where the Government usually accounts for be-
tween 40% and 60% of total salas. We therefore suggest the
following
:
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1. PM»s should act responsibly. They should re- |
sist the natural temptation to taka overzaalous
advantage of lulls in capacity utilization-- to j
drive "hard bargains, " and buy goods at very
low profit margins. I
2. Wavs should be found to improve management's
vi%w of the risk/return relationship for DoD
business. Perhaps a guarantee of some minimum
level cf profit would be appropriate--or higher |
allowed profit levels when capacity utilization |
is high.
5.4 ASSOaPTIOHS FOLLOWED
Throughout this analysis we have followed both explicitly
and implicitly cartain assumptions it might be well to re-
view. In brief, these are as follows.
5.4.1 As suae d DoD Objectives
The following has been assumed with respact to DoD behavior
and views.
5.4.1.1 Reasonable Rates of Return
The DoD understands the improtant role profits play (a) in
maintaining the efficiency and strength of private industry,
and (b) in providing incentive for contractors to perform
services beneficial to the Government. In recognition of
the importance of profits, DoD seeks to sustain an anviron-
ment in which an efficient contractor can earn a reasonable
rate of return while performing services for the Government.
However, the DoD is responsible to the taxpayers. It
must therefore protect against buying practices which might
be wasteful of Government resources. It seeks neither to
raward inefficiency nor to provide contractors with unneces-
sarily high rates of return.
5.4.1.2 Mobilization Base
In the event of a National emergency, tha acquisition re-
quirements cf CoD are likely to be considerably higher than
under peacetime conditions. Since DoD's responsibilities to
safeguard the security of the Nation would continue under
October 27, 1983 Chapter 5
P A G 2 5.9
any circumstances, it is desirable to ensure the continuity
of an industrial base sufficient to meet any reasonably
foreseeable emergency.
An acquisition practice which resulted in small program
cost savings without considering the fa-tor of mobilization
base might rightfully be rejected as imprudent. The econom-
ic consequences of proposed acquisition practices are there-
fore incomplete (albeit important) indicators of desirabili-
ty.
5.4.1.3 Econoaic Analysis is Essential
Although the avowed reason for having oompetiting suppliers
is to bring down the cost to the government, competition may
be introduced for a wide variety of reasons other than fi-
nancial. At the legislative level, competing suppliers have
been awarded contracts on grounds of fairnass, even-handed-
ness, employment, etc. At the military department level,
mobilization base and improvement in technical performance
are often cited as major reasons for dual sourcing. In our
view, fairness, employment and mobilization base are pol icy
issues which, by nature, do not render themselves to quanti-
fied analysis.
However, a financial cost-benefit analysis of the dual
sourcing decision remains a useful tool for decision Bakers.
Even if the result shows dual sourcing is uneconomical, the
magnitude of the cost serves as useful input for the d=ci-
sion maker in setting policies.
5.4.1.4 Advantage of Efficiency
An efficient group of contractors is able to (a) produce a
given requirement with lower consumption of taxpayer re-
sources and/or (b) produce a larger requirement with a given
level of resource consumption. Both these chacter ist ics are
desirable from the perspective of the DoD.
The mandate DoD has to protect against buying practices
which might be wasteful of Government resources is facili-
tated by the existence of a supplier group which can mini-
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mize the resource consumption necessary to meet a given re-
quirement. DcD*s responsibility to protect the Nation under
any circumstances is facilitated by contractors who are able
to produce large requirements with given levels of resourc-
es .
5.4.1.5 Discountad Constant Dollars
Due to changes in the purchasing power of the dollar, costs
should be adjusted to constant dollars when comparing acqui-
sition practices. Since funding for acquisitions is concur-
rent with expenditures which, in turn, are normally concur-
rent with the fulfillment of requirements, it is normally
necessary to discount expenditures to present value when
evaluating proposed acquisition practices.
DoD acquisitions present seme of the characteristics of
executory contracts in that funding and expenditures are
concurrent with the fulfillment of the requirement. DoD has
neither the authority nor the means to make significant tem-
poral adjustments in its funding. Therefore, discounted
constant dollar program cost is the most relevant economic
measure of an acquisition practice.
5.4.1.6 Dual Sourcing is Only One Tool
Government has many possible means of controlling the cost
of its acquisition activities. The implementation of dual
sourcing is only one of these. Its use may or may not be
necessary or desirable, depending on the circumstances.
Dual sourcing is sometimes the best tool for DoD to bring
to bear in attempting to reduce the acquition cost of a par-
ticular requirement. However, implementation is neither al-
ways necessary nor always economically livantageous for DoD.
Depending on the circumstances, other tools may be more ad-
vantageous, more effective and/or more efficient in achiev-
ing the desired effect.
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5. 4. 2 Contractor Strategy and Beh avior
We presume contractors exhibit behavior patterns and adopt
strategies which reflect the following.
5.4.2.1 Pricing Flexibility
Unless the procurement is to be conducts! in a one-shot con-
tract situation where the total guantity is to' be awarded
all at once, both the prime and the second source ^xprct or-
ders for soma minimum quantity for the duration of the pro-
gram. Given this expectation, the supplier has the flexi-
bility of proposing a high initial price and steep price
reduction curve or lower initial price and flat price reduc-
tion curve, depending on which strategy is more advantageous
to the firm.
5.4.2.2 To Win or Hot To lin?
It is naive to assume that contractars always attempt to
capture the larger share of an annual buy. Several studies
have shown production rate to be a major factor in determin-
ing contract cost. But one cannot assume that economy of
scale always fellows large quantities of production. If one
(or both) contractor has limited capacity, it may be more
advantageous to be the loser in a dual-source program.
5.4.2.3 Gaming is Possible
One must accept the fact that, in a dual source competition,
there is no price competition whatsoever at a guaranteed
loser's share level. Results of studias have shown that at
this level the offered prices were loaded. If ""This lower
quantity is more advantageous to either contractor, the re-
spective bid will be high. If it is more advantageous to
both, a two-player gaming situation exists and the effect of
price competition disappears.
5.4.2.4 Incumbent Discourages Competition
A sole source supplier enjoys a certain degree of freedom in
production and price negotiations. Therefore, the incumbent
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has thr incentive to discourage the introduction of competi-
tion. As discussed above, the lowering of prices of early
lots is a feasible strategy.
5.4.2.5 Objective is Return on Met Worth
Although there have been criticisms of the profit maximiza-
tion 'assumption, recent studies have shown that a number of
criteria are just different forms of profit maximization on
a long term basis.
5. 4.2.6 Cost Allocation Complicates Measurement
Although the Cost Accounting Standard Board prescribed the
way indirect costs are to be allocated, considerable flexi-
bility remains in the selection of cost pools, allocation
basis, and the classification of costs. The same set of
production costs in curred by a contractor could result in
entirely different amounts of cost being allocated to the
same final cost object, depending on different, but permit-
ted, ways of making the allocations.
5. 5 CONCLUSIONS
The research effort discussed here wis funded under OKR
grant No. N000 1483WR3Q236, dated 28 December 1982. The
Statement of Work which specified the task to be accom-
plished read as follows:
Market environments re levant to th a sole source versus
dual source decision for the P.CDCur em ent of ma jor
weapon systems will be identifi ed. The p ricing behav-
icr of contractors o perating in these envir Dnments
will be analyzed, and its potential impact on program
cost will be studied. Sui table data from NAVAlR's
contract file will be ased , if appropriat e, for empir-
ical verification. The object i ve is to derive an op-
timal acquisition stra tegy for th(= various market en-
vironments.
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We indeed have identified market environments relevant to
the sole source versus dual source decision for the procure-
ment of major weapDn systems. Du: most important finding is
that the state of capacity utilization in the aerospace in-
dustry is a highly relevant aspect of the environment.
The pricing behavior of contractors Dparating under dif-
ferent dagreas of "busyness" was analyzsi, and its impact on
program cost was studied. Tha environment's impact on con-
tractor profitability was also studied.
Historical data from seven major weapon systems acguisi-
tions (shown in Appendix A) ware used f3r empirical verifi-
cation. The empirical analysis gave strong statistical
creditability to tha hypotheses tasted.
The results of the study point the way for development
and implementation of superior acquisition strategies. Tha
strategies which should fellow will ba applicable to various
market environments.
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AEROSPACE CAPACITY UTILIZATION HISTORY
SO. CY48 CY4 9 CY5 CY51 CY52 CY53
JAN 39. 1 40. 2 32. 1 46.2 7 0.0 91 .2
FEB 38.6 41.2 32. 1 48.2 71.6 91.2
MAR 38.9 4 1. 3 31. 3 50.6 73.5 91 .2
APH 39.it 40.2 31.9 52.5 74.2 9 1.0
MAY 33.8 39.7 33.8 53.5 77.7 90.9
JUN 39. 1 3 9.0 35.0 55.0 79.7 90.5
JUL 38.8 38.5 36. 1 55.7 31.1 91.7
AUG 39.6 35.6 40. 1 57.4 82.9 92.0
SEP 39.9 36.6 40.5 59.0 82.3 90.4
OCT 40.5 34.7 41. 9 59.5 86.3 90. 3
MOV 40. 1 34. 1 43. 4 65.3 86.7 84^3
DEC 40. 4 3 2.9 44.6 67.1 39.
b
33.6
MO. CY54 CY55 CY56 CY57 CY58 CY59
JAN 82. 1 71. 1 74.6 37.0 73.0 70. 1
FEB 30. 1 70.9 75.6 38.2 70.6 70.2
MAR 78.9 70.9 75.5 88.5 70.4 69.4
APR 76.7 71.4 76.4 88.2 69.0 71.1
MAY 75. 8 7 3.0 77.9 36.2 67.9 71.3
JUN 74.5 71. 7 78. 1 87.0 6 8.0 72. 1
JUL 73.5 72.3 79.5 85.6 67.9 73.3
AUG 72.5 72.5 79.8 34.6 68.7 72.6
SEP 72.2 7 2.9 79. 1 82.2 69.3 69.2
OCT 71. 1 74.4 82. 1 79.9 69.4 68.6
NOV 70.8 74. 1 84. 6 76.0 70.6 68.6
DEC 70.8 74.7 86.3 73.3 70.6 68.5
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MO. CY60 CY6 1 CY6 2 CY63 CY64 CY65
JAN 67.9 66. 4 71. 9 84.8 82.3 81 .4
FEB 63.7 6 5.4 74.0 84.2 82.8 80.9
MAR 67.9 66. 6 75.0 83.6 82.6 80.9
APR 67.9 67.0 75. 1 82.7 32.9 81.4
MAY 69.5 67.5 76. 1 80.5 83.3 83.3
JUN 63.7 67.0 77.0 82.4 82.0 82.9
JUL 66.3 67. 1 78.6 83.0 80.6 83.4
AUG 66. 3 67.8 79.5 83.5 30.4 83.3
SEP 66.0 70.2 79.3 83.9 80.3 84.3
OCT 66.8 70.5 79.7 83.5 60.3 36.5
NOV 66.0 72.2 79.8 82.1 81 .4 87.4
DEC 65.9 72.6 80. 1 82.0 81.0 88.4
MO. CY66 CY6 7 CY6 3 CY69 CY70 CY71
JAN 91.6 92.6 89. 1 83.5 76.0 64.8
FEB 90'. 2 91.4 90.4 82.7 74.6 63.5
MAR 90.6 92.3 89.0 84.1 73.8 62.5
ARP 90.0 9 3.2 86.3 83.5 73.0 61.7
MAY 90.9 92.2 87.7 83.6 69.8 63.4
JUN 90. 1 92.0 88.7 82.1 69.3 63.4
JUL 92.7 90.3 88. 1 82.6 69.3 63. 1
AUG 94.2 90.7 86.6 32.3 68.2 63.4
SEP 92.0 90.2 85.8 32.7 67.5 6 3.8
OCT 93.3 90.0 84. 5 82.1 65.6 65.1
NOV 93. 1 89.5 84.3 80.0 65.8 63.5
DEC 93. 1 90.4 83.7 78.1 65.0 63.6
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HO. CY72 CY73 CY74 CY75 CY76 CY77
JAN 64.6 71. 7 74. 9 72.,1 72.,4 69.9
FEB 64. 8 73. 1 75. 1 69..3 72. 1 70.7
MAR 66, 1 73. 6 75. 9 69.,1 71. 1 70.3
APR 67.0 72. 8 74. 5 68.,0 69. 1 71.0
MAY 67. 1 7 3. 5 76. 5 71..7 69.,5 71.7
JON 67. 5 7 3. 9 77. 5 73.,1 67. 1 72. 1
JOL 67. 4 74. 7 76. 5 73..5 66.,8 72.5
AUG 66.3 75. 77. 4 73,,9 67. 4 72.4
SEP 67.5 75. 77. 73..1 67.,1 73.3
OCT 68.7 75. 3 75. 1 70.,9 69. 69.9
NOV 70.6 76. 4 75. 2 71 ,.0 69.,2 70.1
DEC 71.5 76. 3 73. 4 71..9 69. 2 72.7
MO. CY78 CI7 9 CY80 CY81 CY32
JAN 73..6 85. 8 90. 9 84.2 71.3
FEB 72..8 87. 2 91, , 1 82.2 73.1
MAR 76..4 87. 4 90. 7 81.6 71.5
APR 77.,6 86. 6 88. 5 81.3 70.0
MAY 78..0 87. 4 86. 1 80.5 69.5
JON 78..6 88. 3 85.,6 79.0 68.7
JUL 79..6 89. 85.,5 78.3 67.9
AUG 80..6 8 8. 8 84.,5 76.9 66.9
SEP 82..9 89. 9 84.,2 76.7 66.6
OCT 83..3 9 2. 84.,5 75.7 67. 1
NOV 84,.7 92. 1 85.,0 74.9 67.0
DEC 85,.5 91. 9 85.,0 74.6 67.0
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